holding
P2237
predicate
Indicates that one entity is physically grasping, carrying, or keeping another entity in its possession or control.
Observed surface forms (1)
- keeps ×3
Sample triples (401)
| Subject | Object |
|---|---|
| Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission |
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
self-linksurface differs
ⓘ
surface form:
Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated the Free Exercise Clause by showing hostility toward the baker’s religious beliefs
|
| Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission | the Commission’s treatment of the case was inconsistent with the State’s obligation of religious neutrality ⓘ |
| Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission | the decision was based on the particular facts of the case and was narrow in scope ⓘ |
| Mathews v. Eldridge | Due process does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefits. ⓘ |
| Mathews v. Eldridge | The adequacy of administrative procedures for due process purposes is evaluated using a three-factor balancing test. ⓘ |
| McCulloch v. Maryland | Congress has implied powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause to create a national bank ⓘ |
| McCulloch v. Maryland | federal law is supreme over conflicting state law ⓘ |
| McCulloch v. Maryland | the State of Maryland may not tax instruments of the national government ⓘ |
| McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green | A Title VII plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination ⓘ |
| McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green | Established a burden-shifting framework for proving discrimination under Title VII when there is no direct evidence of discrimination ⓘ |
| McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green | If the employer articulates a legitimate reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason is a pretext for discrimination ⓘ |
| McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green | Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action ⓘ |
| McGhee v. Sipes | judicial enforcement of private racially restrictive covenants constitutes state action ⓘ |
| McGhee v. Sipes | state courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants without violating the Equal Protection Clause ⓘ |
| McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents | Once admitted to a state-supported graduate school, a student must receive the same treatment as students of other races. ⓘ |
|
McLaurin was required to sit in designated segregated areas in classrooms, the library, and the cafeteria.
surface form:
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents
|
Segregating a Black graduate student within a previously all-white public university violates the Equal Protection Clause ⓘ |
|
McLaurin was required to sit in designated segregated areas in classrooms, the library, and the cafeteria.
surface form:
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents
|
State-imposed segregation within the same educational facilities is unconstitutional ⓘ |
| McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents | The differential treatment of a student in a graduate school of a state university solely because of his race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ⓘ |
| Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson | Sexual harassment that creates a hostile or abusive work environment is actionable under Title VII even without economic or tangible job detriment ⓘ |
| Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson |
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
ⓘ
surface form:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits hostile work environment sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination
|
| Milliken v. Bradley | Federal courts may not impose multi-district, area-wide desegregation plans absent a showing that multiple districts had deliberately engaged in a common, interdistrict constitutional violation ⓘ |
| Milliken v. Bradley | Without proof of interdistrict segregation, remedies must be limited to the district where a constitutional violation is found ⓘ |
| Miranda v. Arizona | If a suspect indicates in any manner that they wish to remain silent, interrogation must cease. ⓘ |
| Miranda v. Arizona | If a suspect requests an attorney, interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. ⓘ |
| Miranda v. Arizona | Prosecution may not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of a defendant unless procedural safeguards are used to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. ⓘ |
| Miranda v. Arizona | Suspects in custody must be informed of their right to remain silent and their right to an attorney before interrogation. ⓘ |
| Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan | A state-supported nursing school's women-only admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause ⓘ |
| Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan | Excluding men from a state-supported professional nursing program constituted unconstitutional sex discrimination ⓘ |
| Morgan v. Virginia | state laws requiring racial segregation on interstate buses are unconstitutional ⓘ |
| Morgan v. Virginia | state segregation laws that burden interstate commerce violate the Commerce Clause ⓘ |
| Murdock v. Pennsylvania | A flat license tax on the distribution of religious literature is unconstitutional as applied to religious colporteurs ⓘ |
| Murdock v. Pennsylvania | Freedom of press, speech, and religion cannot be conditioned on the payment of a license tax ⓘ |
| Murdock v. Pennsylvania | The First Amendment prohibits imposing a license tax on the exercise of religious proselytizing and distribution of religious literature ⓘ |
|
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (2018)
surface form:
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
|
Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures to maintain prohibitions on sports gambling. ⓘ |
|
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (2018)
surface form:
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
|
PASPA’s provision prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling is not severable from the rest of the statute. ⓘ |
|
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (2018)
surface form:
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
|
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act’s provisions prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling schemes violate the anti-commandeering rule of the Tenth Amendment. ⓘ |
| NFIB v. Sebelius | Anti-Injunction Act does not bar the suit ⓘ |
| NFIB v. Sebelius | Medicaid expansion as enacted is unconstitutionally coercive on the states ⓘ |
| NFIB v. Sebelius | individual mandate exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause ⓘ |
| NFIB v. Sebelius | individual mandate is a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power ⓘ |
| NFIB v. Sebelius | remedy for Medicaid expansion is to bar withholding of existing Medicaid funds from nonconsenting states ⓘ |
| NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. | Congress may regulate labor relations when they have a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce ⓘ |
| NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. | The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 is constitutional as applied to the respondent ⓘ |
| NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. |
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
self-linksurface differs
ⓘ
surface form:
The National Labor Relations Board may order reinstatement of workers fired for union activity in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce
|
| National League of Cities v. Usery | Congress may not, under the Commerce Clause, directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions ⓘ |
| National League of Cities v. Usery | minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act could not constitutionally be applied to certain state employees performing traditional governmental functions ⓘ |
| New York Times Co. v. United States |
First Amendment to the United States Constitution
ⓘ
surface form:
The First Amendment severely limits the government’s power to enjoin publication of news by the press.
|
| New York Times Co. v. United States | The government did not meet the heavy burden required to justify a prior restraint on publication. ⓘ |
| New York v. United States (1992) | Congress may not compel states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program ⓘ |
| New York v. United States (1992) | the federal government cannot commandeer the legislative processes of the states ⓘ |