Benton v. Maryland

E284995

Benton v. Maryland is a 1969 U.S. Supreme Court decision that applied the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

All labels observed (3)

How this entity was disambiguated

Statements (48)

Predicate Object
instanceOf U.S. Supreme Court case
constitutional law case
criminal procedure case
areaOfLaw criminal procedure
incorporation doctrine
arguedDate 1968-12-12
citation 395 U.S. 784
concurrenceBy John M. Harlan II
surface form: Justice John M. Harlan II
constitutionalProvisionInvolved Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment
surface form: Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
country United States of America
surface form: United States
court Supreme Court of the United States
decisionDate 1969-03-24
dissentBy Hugo L. Black
surface form: Justice Hugo L. Black
docketNumber No. 105
factSummary After Benton successfully challenged the jury oath and obtained a new trial, the state retried him on both burglary and larceny, and he was convicted on both counts.
Benton v. Maryland self-linksurface differs
surface form: Benton was tried in Maryland state court on charges including burglary and larceny and was acquitted of larceny but convicted of burglary.
fullName Benton v. Maryland self-linksurface differs
surface form: Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)
holding Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
surface form: The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

The earlier decision in Palko v. Connecticut, limiting incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is overruled.
impact Confirmed that protection against double jeopardy is a fundamental right enforceable against the states.
Expanded the scope of the incorporation doctrine for criminal procedural safeguards.
incorporationType selective incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause
issue Whether a defendant can be retried on a charge for which he was previously acquitted after a successful appeal on another count.
Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
joinedByInMajority Earl Warren
surface form: Chief Justice Earl Warren

Abe Fortas
surface form: Justice Abe Fortas

Byron R. White
surface form: Justice Byron R. White

Potter Stewart
surface form: Justice Potter Stewart

William J. Brennan Jr.
surface form: Justice William J. Brennan Jr.

William O. Douglas
surface form: Justice William O. Douglas
judgment Reversed
legalDoctrine double jeopardy
majorityOpinionBy Thurgood Marshall
surface form: Justice Thurgood Marshall
originatingCourt Circuit Court for Calvert County
surface form: Circuit Court for Calvert County, Maryland
overruled Palko v. Connecticut
overruledCitation Palko v. Connecticut
surface form: Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)
petitioner John Dalmer Benton
proceduralPosture Appeal from the Court of Appeals of Maryland
relatedCase Duncan v. Louisiana
Malloy v. Hogan
Washington v. Texas
relatedConcept fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
respondent Maryland
surface form: State of Maryland
ruleOfLaw A state may not subject a defendant to a second trial for an offense of which he has been acquitted.
stateInvolved Maryland
subjectMatter criminal prosecution for burglary and larceny
timePeriod Warren Court era

How these facts were elicited

Referenced by (6)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Palko v. Connecticut overruledBy Benton v. Maryland
Palko v. Connecticut overruledInPart Benton v. Maryland
Palko v. Connecticut relatedCase Benton v. Maryland
Duncan v. Louisiana relatedCase Benton v. Maryland
Benton v. Maryland fullName Benton v. Maryland self-linksurface differs
this entity surface form: Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)
Benton v. Maryland factSummary Benton v. Maryland self-linksurface differs
this entity surface form: Benton was tried in Maryland state court on charges including burglary and larceny and was acquitted of larceny but convicted of burglary.