Nash bargaining solution
E2666
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
Observed surface forms (2)
| Surface form | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| The Bargaining Problem | 1 |
| article "The Bargaining Problem" | 1 |
Statements (46)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
bargaining solution concept
ⓘ
cooperative game theory concept ⓘ solution concept in game theory ⓘ |
| appliesTo |
cooperative bargaining problem
ⓘ
two-person bargaining problem ⓘ |
| assumes |
transferable cardinal utilities up to positive affine transformations
ⓘ
expected utility theory (with John von Neumann) ⓘ
surface form:
von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions
|
| author |
John Nash
ⓘ
surface form:
John Forbes Nash Jr.
|
| basedOn |
axiom of Pareto efficiency
ⓘ
axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives ⓘ axiom of invariance to affine transformations of utility ⓘ axiom of symmetry ⓘ |
| category |
axiomatic game theory
ⓘ
bargaining theory ⓘ |
| characterizedBy |
Pareto efficiency
ⓘ
independence of irrelevant alternatives ⓘ scale invariance of utilities ⓘ symmetry between players ⓘ uniqueness under Nash’s axioms ⓘ |
| defines | unique outcome of a bargaining problem ⓘ |
| domainRestriction |
feasible set must be compact and convex
ⓘ
utilities at solution must weakly exceed disagreement utilities ⓘ |
| field |
economics
ⓘ
game theory ⓘ mathematics ⓘ |
| hasProperty |
Pareto optimal outcome
ⓘ
no player can be made better off without making the other worse off at the solution ⓘ voluntary participation by both players ⓘ |
| influenced |
axiomatic bargaining theory
ⓘ
contract theory ⓘ mechanism design ⓘ |
| introducedIn |
Nash bargaining solution
self-linksurface differs
ⓘ
surface form:
article "The Bargaining Problem"
|
| maximizes | product of players’ utility gains over disagreement point ⓘ |
| namedAfter |
John Nash
ⓘ
surface form:
John Forbes Nash Jr.
|
| publicationYear | 1950 ⓘ |
| publishedIn | Econometrica ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution
ⓘ
Rubinstein bargaining model ⓘ cooperative game theory ⓘ |
| solutionForm | argmax of (u1 - d1)(u2 - d2) over feasible set ⓘ |
| usedIn |
bargaining in industrial organization
ⓘ
bargaining in international trade models ⓘ household bargaining models ⓘ labor negotiations modeling ⓘ |
| usesConcept |
disagreement point
ⓘ
feasible utility set ⓘ |
Referenced by (6)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
this entity surface form:
article "The Bargaining Problem"
this entity surface form:
The Bargaining Problem