Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution
E15614
The Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution is a cooperative game theory concept that selects a fair agreement between parties by preserving proportional gains relative to their best possible outcomes.
Aliases (1)
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
bargaining solution concept
→
concept in game theory → solution concept in cooperative game theory → |
| aimsTo |
preserve proportional gains relative to ideal payoffs
→
select a fair agreement between players → |
| appliesTo |
bargaining over divisible goods
→
international negotiations → labor negotiations → |
| author |
Ehud Kalai
→
Meir Smorodinsky → |
| basedOn |
Pareto efficiency
→
individual rationality → monotonicity → symmetry → |
| characterizedBy |
Pareto optimality
→
invariance to positive affine transformations of utilities → monotonicity in feasible set expansions → preservation of proportional gains → |
| comparedWith |
Nash bargaining solution
→
|
| definedFor |
two-person bargaining problems
→
|
| describedIn |
article "Other solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem"
→
|
| differsFrom |
Nash bargaining solution in its axiom of monotonicity
→
|
| field |
bargaining theory
→
cooperative game theory → |
| hasGeneralization |
multi-person bargaining problems
→
|
| hasProperty |
focus on maximal individually attainable utilities
→
scale invariance → |
| introducedIn |
1975
→
|
| namedAfter |
Ehud Kalai
→
Meir Smorodinsky → |
| publishedIn |
Econometrica
→
|
| relatedConcept |
Nash bargaining solution
→
bargaining set → egalitarian bargaining solution → |
| satisfies |
Pareto efficiency axiom
→
individual rationality axiom → invariance to affine transformations axiom → monotonicity axiom → symmetry axiom → |
| selectsPoint |
on the Pareto frontier
→
that equalizes players’ proportional gains from disagreement to utopia → |
| usedIn |
axiomatic bargaining theory
→
social choice theory → welfare economics → |
| usesConcept |
disagreement point
→
feasible utility set → utopia point → |
| violates |
independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom
→
|
Referenced by (2)
| Subject (surface form when different) | Predicate |
|---|---|
|
Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution
("article "Other solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem"")
→
|
describedIn |
|
Nash bargaining solution
→
|
relatedTo |