Rubinstein bargaining model
E16268
alternating-offers bargaining game
bargaining model
dynamic game
infinite-horizon game
noncooperative game-theoretic model
The Rubinstein bargaining model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that analyzes how two parties reach agreement over time through alternating offers under the influence of impatience and strategic delay.
All labels observed (2)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Rubinstein bargaining model canonical | 4 |
| “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model” | 1 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T131711 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Rubinstein bargaining model Context triple: [Nash bargaining solution, relatedTo, Rubinstein bargaining model]
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A.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
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B.
Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution
The Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution is a cooperative game theory concept that selects a fair agreement between parties by preserving proportional gains relative to their best possible outcomes.
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C.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior is a foundational 1944 book by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern that established game theory as a rigorous mathematical framework for analyzing strategic decision-making in economics.
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D.
expected utility theory (with John von Neumann)
Expected utility theory (with John von Neumann) is a foundational framework in economics and decision theory that models how rational agents make choices under uncertainty by maximizing the expected value of a utility function.
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E.
Non-cooperative Games
Non-cooperative Games is John Nash’s seminal 1950 paper that founded modern non-cooperative game theory and introduced the concept now known as Nash equilibrium.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NED2
Entity disambiguation (via description)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Rubinstein bargaining model Target entity description: The Rubinstein bargaining model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that analyzes how two parties reach agreement over time through alternating offers under the influence of impatience and strategic delay.
-
A.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
-
B.
Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution
The Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution is a cooperative game theory concept that selects a fair agreement between parties by preserving proportional gains relative to their best possible outcomes.
-
C.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior is a foundational 1944 book by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern that established game theory as a rigorous mathematical framework for analyzing strategic decision-making in economics.
-
D.
expected utility theory (with John von Neumann)
Expected utility theory (with John von Neumann) is a foundational framework in economics and decision theory that models how rational agents make choices under uncertainty by maximizing the expected value of a utility function.
-
E.
Non-cooperative Games
Non-cooperative Games is John Nash’s seminal 1950 paper that founded modern non-cooperative game theory and introduced the concept now known as Nash equilibrium.
- F. None of above. chosen
Statements (49)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
alternating-offers bargaining game
ⓘ
bargaining model ⓘ dynamic game ⓘ infinite-horizon game ⓘ noncooperative game-theoretic model ⓘ |
| analyzes |
alternating offers
ⓘ
bilateral bargaining ⓘ role of impatience in bargaining ⓘ strategic delay ⓘ |
| appliesTo |
bargaining over prices
ⓘ
contract bargaining ⓘ trade negotiations ⓘ wage bargaining ⓘ |
| assumes |
common knowledge of preferences
ⓘ
discounting of future payoffs ⓘ infinite sequence of possible offers ⓘ perfect information ⓘ two players ⓘ |
| coreIdea |
equilibrium agreement occurs without delay despite possible strategic delay off-path
ⓘ
equilibrium division depends only on discount factors ⓘ |
| feature |
alternating offers between players
ⓘ
division of a surplus or pie ⓘ immediate agreement in equilibrium ⓘ stationary strategies in equilibrium ⓘ subgame perfect equilibrium ⓘ time preference via discount factors ⓘ unique equilibrium outcome under standard assumptions ⓘ |
| field |
bargaining theory
ⓘ
game theory ⓘ microeconomics ⓘ |
| formalizedIn | extensive-form game ⓘ |
| influenced | axiomatic bargaining theory ⓘ |
| introducedBy | Ariel Rubinstein ⓘ |
| introducedIn |
Rubinstein bargaining model
self-linksurface differs
ⓘ
surface form:
“Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”
|
| namedAfter | Ariel Rubinstein ⓘ |
| publishedIn | Econometrica ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
Nash bargaining solution
ⓘ
alternating-offers models with outside options ⓘ bargaining with incomplete information ⓘ sequential bargaining models ⓘ |
| shows |
cost of delay affects bargaining power
ⓘ
more patient player obtains larger share of surplus ⓘ time preferences determine division of surplus ⓘ |
| solutionConcept | subgame perfect Nash equilibrium ⓘ |
| usedFor |
analyzing efficiency of bargaining outcomes
ⓘ
studying how time preferences affect bargaining power ⓘ |
| uses |
backward induction reasoning
ⓘ
discount factor of each player ⓘ |
| yearIntroduced | 1982 ⓘ |
How these facts were elicited
The pipeline generated the facts above by prompting gpt-5.1 with this entity's name + description and the instruction below.
Instruction
You are a knowledge base construction expert. Given a subject entity and a description of it, return factual statements that you know for the subject as a JSON list of dictionaries(triples), where keys must be "subject", "predicate" and "object". The number of facts may be very high, between 25 to 50 or more, for very popular subjects. For less popular subjects, the number of facts can be very low, like 5 or 10. # Requirements - If you don't know the subject at all, return an empty list. - If the subject is not a named entity, return an empty list. - Include at least one triple where predicate is "instanceOf". - Do not get too wordy. - Separate several objects into multiple triples with one object.
Input
Subject: Rubinstein bargaining model Description of subject: The Rubinstein bargaining model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that analyzes how two parties reach agreement over time through alternating offers under the influence of impatience and strategic delay.
Referenced by (5)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
this entity surface form:
“Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”