Rubinstein bargaining model
E16268
alternating-offers bargaining game
bargaining model
dynamic game
infinite-horizon game
noncooperative game-theoretic model
The Rubinstein bargaining model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that analyzes how two parties reach agreement over time through alternating offers under the influence of impatience and strategic delay.
Observed surface forms (1)
| Surface form | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model” | 1 |
Statements (49)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
alternating-offers bargaining game
ⓘ
bargaining model ⓘ dynamic game ⓘ infinite-horizon game ⓘ noncooperative game-theoretic model ⓘ |
| analyzes |
alternating offers
ⓘ
bilateral bargaining ⓘ role of impatience in bargaining ⓘ strategic delay ⓘ |
| appliesTo |
bargaining over prices
ⓘ
contract bargaining ⓘ trade negotiations ⓘ wage bargaining ⓘ |
| assumes |
common knowledge of preferences
ⓘ
discounting of future payoffs ⓘ infinite sequence of possible offers ⓘ perfect information ⓘ two players ⓘ |
| coreIdea |
equilibrium agreement occurs without delay despite possible strategic delay off-path
ⓘ
equilibrium division depends only on discount factors ⓘ |
| feature |
alternating offers between players
ⓘ
division of a surplus or pie ⓘ immediate agreement in equilibrium ⓘ stationary strategies in equilibrium ⓘ subgame perfect equilibrium ⓘ time preference via discount factors ⓘ unique equilibrium outcome under standard assumptions ⓘ |
| field |
bargaining theory
ⓘ
game theory ⓘ microeconomics ⓘ |
| formalizedIn | extensive-form game ⓘ |
| influenced | axiomatic bargaining theory ⓘ |
| introducedBy | Ariel Rubinstein ⓘ |
| introducedIn |
Rubinstein bargaining model
self-linksurface differs
ⓘ
surface form:
“Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”
|
| namedAfter | Ariel Rubinstein ⓘ |
| publishedIn | Econometrica ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
Nash bargaining solution
ⓘ
alternating-offers models with outside options ⓘ bargaining with incomplete information ⓘ sequential bargaining models ⓘ |
| shows |
cost of delay affects bargaining power
ⓘ
more patient player obtains larger share of surplus ⓘ time preferences determine division of surplus ⓘ |
| solutionConcept | subgame perfect Nash equilibrium ⓘ |
| usedFor |
analyzing efficiency of bargaining outcomes
ⓘ
studying how time preferences affect bargaining power ⓘ |
| uses |
backward induction reasoning
ⓘ
discount factor of each player ⓘ |
| yearIntroduced | 1982 ⓘ |
Referenced by (5)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
this entity surface form:
“Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”