Non-cooperative Games
E630
Non-cooperative Games is John Nash’s seminal 1950 paper that founded modern non-cooperative game theory and introduced the concept now known as Nash equilibrium.
Observed surface forms (1)
| Surface form | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Nash equilibrium | 4 |
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
academic paper
ⓘ
game theory paper ⓘ scientific article ⓘ |
| author |
John Nash
ⓘ
surface form:
John F. Nash
John Nash ⓘ
surface form:
John Forbes Nash Jr.
|
| citationStyleTitle | Non-Cooperative Games ⓘ |
| contribution |
formulated equilibrium as a fixed point of best-response mappings
ⓘ
founded modern non-cooperative game theory ⓘ proved existence of equilibrium for finite non-cooperative games ⓘ |
| countryOfOrigin |
United States of America
ⓘ
surface form:
United States
|
| defines |
equilibrium point of a game
ⓘ
mixed strategy ⓘ non-cooperative game in normal form ⓘ |
| field |
economics
ⓘ
game theory ⓘ mathematics ⓘ |
| focusesOn |
finite games
ⓘ
games with a finite number of pure strategies ⓘ non-cooperative games with a finite number of players ⓘ strategic-form games ⓘ |
| hasAuthorAffiliation | Princeton University ⓘ |
| historicalSignificance |
one of the foundational papers of modern game theory
ⓘ
seminal work in non-cooperative game theory ⓘ |
| influencedField |
evolutionary game theory
ⓘ
industrial organization ⓘ microeconomics ⓘ political science ⓘ theory of bargaining ⓘ |
| introducedConcept |
Non-cooperative Games
self-linksurface differs
ⓘ
surface form:
Nash equilibrium
non-cooperative game ⓘ strategic-form game equilibrium ⓘ |
| language | English ⓘ |
| mainResult |
every finite non-cooperative game has at least one equilibrium point in mixed strategies
ⓘ
existence theorem for equilibrium points in n-person games ⓘ |
| originalSubmissionYear | 1950 ⓘ |
| publicationYear | 1951 ⓘ |
| publishedIn | Annals of Mathematics ⓘ |
| publisher | Annals of Mathematics ⓘ |
| recognition | associated with John Nash’s Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1994 ⓘ |
| relatedConcept |
best response
ⓘ
mixed-strategy equilibrium ⓘ normal-form representation of games ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
Equilibrium points in n-person games
ⓘ
Nash bargaining solution ⓘ
surface form:
The Bargaining Problem
|
| topic |
equilibrium analysis in games without binding agreements
ⓘ
strategic interaction among rational players ⓘ |
| usesTool |
Kakutani fixed-point theorem
ⓘ
fixed-point theorem ⓘ |
Referenced by (6)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
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Nash equilibrium
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Nash equilibrium
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Nash equilibrium
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Nash equilibrium