Humphrey’s Executor v. United States

E192996

Humphrey’s Executor v. United States is a 1935 U.S. Supreme Court case that limited the president’s power to remove officials of independent regulatory agencies, reinforcing their insulation from direct executive control.

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Statements (47)

Predicate Object
instanceOf United States Supreme Court case
administrative law case
separation of powers case
appliesTo independent regulatory agencies
officers with fixed terms and for-cause removal protections
aroseFrom President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s attempt to remove FTC Commissioner William E. Humphrey
concernsOffice Federal Trade Commission
concernsOfficial FTC commissioner
concernsPresident President Franklin D. Roosevelt
surface form: Franklin D. Roosevelt
distinguishedFrom Myers v. United States
hasChiefJustice Charles Evans Hughes
hasCitation 295 U.S. 602
hasConstitutionalProvision Article II of the United States Constitution
hasConstitutionalTheme checks and balances
scope of executive power
hasCountry United States of America
surface form: United States
hasCourt Supreme Court of the United States
hasDecisionDate May 27, 1935
hasDecisionType unanimous decision
hasDecisionYear 1935
hasEra New Deal
surface form: New Deal era
hasFullCaseName Humphrey’s Executor v. United States self-linksurface differs
surface form: Humphrey’s Executor, Petitioner v. United States
hasJurisdiction United States government
surface form: federal government of the United States
hasLanguage English
hasLegalIssue independence of regulatory commissions
presidential removal power
separation of powers between branches of government
hasOpinionAuthor Charles Evans Hughes
hasPetitioner Humphrey’s Executor
hasRespondent United States of America
surface form: United States
hasStatuteInvolved Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914
surface form: Federal Trade Commission Act
hasSubjectMatter administrative agencies
public law
hasVote 9–0
held Congress may limit the President’s power to remove officers of independent regulatory agencies to specified causes such as inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
Members of certain independent regulatory commissions are not purely executive officers subject to at-will presidential removal.
Federal Trade Commission
surface form: The Federal Trade Commission performs quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions and is not subject to full presidential control.

The President may not remove a commissioner of an independent regulatory commission except for the causes specified by Congress in the statute creating the commission.
isCitedIn Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
Morrison v. Olson
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
isKeyPrecedentFor cases on removal protections for independent agency officials
modern administrative state structure
limited Myers v. United States
reinforcedDoctrine congressional power to create independent agencies insulated from direct presidential removal
independence of administrative agencies
resultedIn limitation on presidential power to remove members of independent commissions

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Referenced by (5)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Tenure of Office Act influencedDecision Humphrey’s Executor v. United States
United States Supreme Court cases of the Hughes Court includesCase Humphrey’s Executor v. United States
Myers v. United States laterLimitedBy Humphrey’s Executor v. United States
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States hasFullCaseName Humphrey’s Executor v. United States self-linksurface differs
this entity surface form: Humphrey’s Executor, Petitioner v. United States
Bowsher v. Synar isRelatedCase Humphrey’s Executor v. United States
this entity surface form: Humphrey's Executor v. United States