Nash equilibrium

E833553
equilibrium concept in game theory game-theoretic solution concept

A Nash equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy, given the strategies of all other players.

Try in SPARQL Jump to: Surface forms Statements Referenced by

Observed surface forms (1)

Surface form Occurrences
trembling hand perfect equilibrium 2

Statements (66)

Predicate Object
instanceOf equilibrium concept in game theory ⓘ
game-theoretic solution concept ⓘ
appliedExample Battle of the Sexes NERFINISHED ⓘ
Bertrand competition NERFINISHED ⓘ
Cournot duopoly NERFINISHED ⓘ
Matching Pennies ⓘ
Prisoner’s Dilemma NERFINISHED ⓘ
appliesTo extensive-form games ⓘ
finite games ⓘ
infinite games ⓘ
normal-form games ⓘ
strategic-form games ⓘ
assumes players are rational ⓘ
players correctly anticipate others’ strategies ⓘ
players know the game structure ⓘ
centralTo non-cooperative game theory ⓘ
characterizedBy mutual best responses ⓘ
strategic stability against unilateral deviations ⓘ
criticizedFor lack of predictive power in some games ⓘ
multiple equilibria ⓘ
reliance on strong rationality assumptions ⓘ
definedAs strategy profile where no player can gain by unilaterally deviating ⓘ
definedBy best responses of all players to each other ⓘ
doesNotNecessarilyImply Pareto efficiency ⓘ
existenceProvedBy John Forbes Nash Jr. NERFINISHED ⓘ
field economics ⓘ
evolutionary biology ⓘ
game theory ⓘ
mathematics ⓘ
guaranteedExistenceIn finite games with mixed strategies ⓘ
hasRefinement proper equilibrium ⓘ
sequential equilibrium ⓘ
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium ⓘ
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium NERFINISHED ⓘ
hasVariant correlated equilibrium ⓘ
evolutionarily stable strategy ⓘ
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium ⓘ
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium ⓘ
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium ⓘ
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium NERFINISHED ⓘ
introducedBy John Forbes Nash Jr. NERFINISHED ⓘ
introducedIn 1950 ⓘ
1951 ⓘ
mathematicallyBasedOn Brouwer fixed-point theorem NERFINISHED ⓘ
Kakutani fixed-point theorem NERFINISHED ⓘ
fixed-point theorems ⓘ
mayBe multiple ⓘ
nonexistent in pure strategies ⓘ
unique ⓘ
namedAfter John Forbes Nash Jr. NERFINISHED ⓘ
publication Non-Cooperative Games NERFINISHED ⓘ
publicationYear 1951 ⓘ
relatedConcept Bayesian Nash equilibrium NERFINISHED ⓘ
correlated equilibrium NERFINISHED ⓘ
dominant strategy equilibrium ⓘ
perfect Bayesian equilibrium ⓘ
subgame perfect equilibrium NERFINISHED ⓘ
usedIn algorithmic game theory ⓘ
auction theory ⓘ
bargaining theory ⓘ
evolutionary game theory ⓘ
industrial organization ⓘ
mechanism design ⓘ
oligopoly theory ⓘ
political science ⓘ
usedToModel strategic interaction among rational agents ⓘ

Referenced by (6)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Hotelling’s law → relatedTo → Nash equilibrium ⓘ
Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory → subject → Nash equilibrium ⓘ
Reinhard Selten → knownFor → Nash equilibrium ⓘ
this entity surface form: trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Reinhard Selten → notableConcept → Nash equilibrium ⓘ
this entity surface form: trembling hand perfect equilibrium
“Extensive Games and the Problem of Information” → relatedTo → Nash equilibrium ⓘ
subject surface form: Extensive Games and the Problem of Information
“Classics in Game Theory” (editor) → subject → Nash equilibrium ⓘ
subject surface form: Classics in Game Theory