Tarskian object-language/metalanguage distinction
E71181
The Tarskian object-language/metalanguage distinction is a foundational semantic framework that separates the language in which statements are made from the higher-level language used to talk about and define their truth, thereby avoiding self-referential paradoxes like the liar paradox.
Aliases (4)
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
logical methodology
→
philosophical concept → semantic framework → theory of truth framework → |
| addresses |
conditions for a materially adequate definition of truth
→
self-reference in language → semantic closure → |
| aimsTo |
avoid semantic paradoxes
→
avoid the liar paradox → |
| appliesTo |
formal languages
→
natural languages (by extension) → |
| assumes |
clear syntactic definition of object language
→
metalanguage with greater expressive power → |
| contrastsWith |
type-free truth theories
→
unified language approaches to truth → |
| coreIdea |
a language cannot consistently contain its own global truth predicate
→
semantic notions are defined in a metalanguage, not in the object language itself → truth predicates for a language are formulated only in a higher-level metalanguage → |
| defines |
separation between object language and metalanguage
→
|
| developedInContextOf |
formalized languages
→
mathematical logic → |
| field |
logic
→
metalogic → philosophy of language → philosophy of logic → |
| hasConsequence |
ban on global truth predicate in the object language
→
need for stratified truth predicates → prevention of certain forms of self-referential inconsistency → |
| hasPart |
metalanguage
→
object language → |
| historicalPeriod |
20th-century analytic philosophy
→
|
| influenced |
Kripkean fixed-point theories of truth
→
deflationary theories of truth → formal truth-definition theories → |
| involvesConcept |
hierarchy of languages
→
semantic hierarchy → |
| motivatedBy |
analysis of semantic paradoxes
→
liar paradox → |
| namedAfter |
Alfred Tarski
→
|
| proposedBy |
Alfred Tarski
→
|
| relatedTo |
T-schema
→
Tarski's semantic conception of truth → hierarchical solutions to semantic paradoxes → |
| usedIn |
formal semantics
→
model theory → philosophical logic → philosophy of language → theories of truth → |
Referenced by (6)
| Subject (surface form when different) | Predicate |
|---|---|
|
Tarski's undefinability theorem
("Tarski's hierarchy of languages")
→
Tarski's undefinability theorem ("Tarski's semantic conception of truth") → Tarskian object-language/metalanguage distinction ("Tarski's semantic conception of truth") → |
relatedTo |
|
liar paradox
→
|
addressedBy |
|
Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs
("Metalinguistic Abstraction")
→
|
chapter |
|
Kripke fixed-point theory of truth
("Tarskian hierarchy of languages")
→
|
differsFrom |