liar paradox

E13608

logical paradox philosophical problem self-referential paradox semantic paradox

The liar paradox is a classic self-referential logical puzzle arising from sentences that declare their own falsehood, leading to a contradiction about whether they are true or false.

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All labels observed (3)

Label	Occurrences
Liar paradox	8
liar paradox canonical	5
the Liar Paradox	1

Statements (50)

Predicate	Object
instanceOf	logical paradox ⓘ philosophical problem ⓘ self-referential paradox ⓘ semantic paradox ⓘ
addressedBy	Kripke fixed-point theory of truth ⓘ Tarskian object-language/metalanguage distinction ⓘ contextualist approaches to truth ⓘ deflationary theories of truth ⓘ hierarchical theories of truth ⓘ paraconsistent logics ⓘ three-valued logics ⓘ
coreFeature	self-reference ⓘ semantic circularity ⓘ truth-value contradiction ⓘ
difficulty	cannot be consistently assigned a classical truth value ⓘ
field	mathematical logic ⓘ philosophy of language ⓘ philosophy of logic ⓘ
hasFormulation	I am lying. ⓘ This sentence is false. ⓘ
hasVariant	Yablo's paradox ⓘ revenge liar paradoxes ⓘ strengthened liar paradox ⓘ
historicalAttribution	Epimenides of Crete ⓘ Eubulides of Miletus ⓘ
involvesConcept	bivalence ⓘ falsity ⓘ self-reference in language ⓘ semantic closure ⓘ truth ⓘ
leadsTo	apparent inconsistency in naive truth theory ⓘ violation of classical bivalent semantics ⓘ
logicalForm	sentence that asserts its own falsity ⓘ
motivates	formal theories of truth ⓘ non-classical logics ⓘ restrictions on self-reference ⓘ
problemStatement	If the liar sentence is true, then it is false; if it is false, then it is true. ⓘ
relatedTo	Berry paradox ⓘ Curry paradox ⓘ Epimenides paradox ⓘ Grelling–Nelson paradox ⓘ Gödel's incompleteness theorems ⓘ Russell’s paradox ⓘ surface form: Russell's paradox Tarski's undefinability theorem ⓘ
statusInLogic	central test case for theories of truth and meaning ⓘ
studiedBy	Alfred Tarski ⓘ Graham Priest ⓘ Kurt Gödel ⓘ Saul Kripke ⓘ Stephen Yablo ⓘ

Referenced by (14)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Russell’s paradox → relatedTo → liar paradox ⓘ

Tarskian object-language/metalanguage distinction → motivatedBy → liar paradox ⓘ

Epimenides paradox → involvesConcept → liar paradox ⓘ

Epimenides paradox → relatedTo → liar paradox ⓘ