Yablo's paradox
E73906
Yablo's paradox is a self-referential logical paradox involving an infinite sequence of sentences, each saying that all later sentences in the sequence are false, which challenges traditional notions of semantic paradox and self-reference.
Observed surface forms (1)
| Surface form | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Stephen Yablo's 1993 paper "Paradox without Self-Reference" | 1 |
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
logical paradox
ⓘ
philosophical paradox ⓘ self-referential paradox ⓘ semantic paradox ⓘ |
| analyzedBy |
logicians
ⓘ
philosophers of language ⓘ philosophers of logic ⓘ |
| appearsIn | The Philosophical Review ⓘ |
| challenges |
classical theories of truth
ⓘ
standard treatments of semantic paradox ⓘ traditional accounts of self-reference ⓘ |
| coreStructure |
each sentence says that all later sentences in the sequence are false
ⓘ
no sentence refers to itself or to earlier sentences ⓘ |
| describedAs |
paradox involving only reference to later sentences
ⓘ
paradox without direct self-reference ⓘ |
| field |
logic
ⓘ
philosophical logic ⓘ philosophy of language ⓘ philosophy of logic ⓘ |
| firstSystematicPresentation |
Yablo's paradox
self-linksurface differs
ⓘ
surface form:
Stephen Yablo's 1993 paper "Paradox without Self-Reference"
|
| hasAuthor | Stephen Yablo ⓘ |
| hasConsequence |
influences discussions of circularity and dependence
ⓘ
motivates non-classical logics ⓘ motivates revisionary theories of truth ⓘ raises problems for Tarskian hierarchies of languages ⓘ |
| hasVariant |
modal versions
ⓘ
set-theoretic versions ⓘ temporal versions ⓘ |
| involves |
infinite sequence of sentences
ⓘ
non-well-founded reference pattern ⓘ self-reference ⓘ semantic notions of truth and falsity ⓘ truth predicates ⓘ |
| logicalStatus | generates contradiction under classical assumptions about truth ⓘ |
| motivates |
fixed-point theories of truth
ⓘ
hierarchical and non-hierarchical approaches to truth ⓘ paracomplete logics ⓘ paraconsistent logics ⓘ |
| namedAfter | Stephen Yablo ⓘ |
| publicationYear | 1993 ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
liar paradox
ⓘ
surface form:
Liar paradox
non-classical logics ⓘ self-reference in logic ⓘ semantic paradoxes ⓘ truth-theoretic paradoxes ⓘ |
| typicalFormulation | for each natural number n, sentence Sn says that all sentences Sk with k>n are false ⓘ |
| usedInArgumentFor |
existence of non-well-founded reference
ⓘ
limitations of classical truth-conditional semantics ⓘ |
Referenced by (4)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
this entity surface form:
Stephen Yablo's 1993 paper "Paradox without Self-Reference"