anomalous monism
E289479
Anomalous monism is a philosophical theory of mind that holds mental events are identical with physical events while denying that there are strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical descriptions.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| anomalous monism canonical | 3 |
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
non-reductive physicalism
ⓘ
philosophical theory of mind ⓘ token identity theory ⓘ |
| addresses |
mental causation
ⓘ
mind–body problem ⓘ psychophysical laws ⓘ |
| affirms |
causal closure of the physical domain
ⓘ
supervenience of the mental on the physical ⓘ token identity between mental events and physical events ⓘ |
| aimsToReconcile |
mental causation with physicalism
ⓘ
monism with autonomy of the mental ⓘ |
| characterizedBy |
anomalism of the mental
ⓘ
monism about events ⓘ nomological character of causality ⓘ |
| compatibleWith | multiple realizability of mental states ⓘ |
| coreClaim |
causal relations are governed by strict physical laws
ⓘ
every mental event is identical with some physical event ⓘ mental events are causally efficacious ⓘ there are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical predicates ⓘ |
| criticizedBy |
Jaegwon Kim
ⓘ
Jerry Fodor ⓘ Ted Honderich ⓘ |
| criticizedFor |
alleged epiphenomenalism of the mental
ⓘ
problem of explanatory exclusion ⓘ |
| denies |
existence of strict laws relating mental types to physical types
ⓘ
type identity theory of mind ⓘ |
| epistemicStance | mental descriptions are irreducible to physical descriptions ⓘ |
| hasComponentPrinciple |
principle of the anomalism of the mental
ⓘ
principle of the causal interaction of mental and physical events ⓘ principle of the nomological character of causality ⓘ |
| holdsAboutMentalPredicates | mental predicates are not suitable for inclusion in strict laws ⓘ |
| holdsAboutPhysicalPredicates | physical predicates can figure in strict causal laws ⓘ |
| influenced |
causal theories of action
ⓘ
non-reductive physicalist theories ⓘ |
| influencedBy |
Epistemology Naturalized
ⓘ
surface form:
Quinean naturalism
event ontology ⓘ logical behaviorism ⓘ logical positivism ⓘ |
| locatedInSubfield |
metaphysics
ⓘ
philosophy of mind ⓘ |
| mainWork | Mental Events ⓘ |
| ontologicalStance | there is only one kind of event, the physical event ⓘ |
| proposedBy | Donald Davidson ⓘ |
| relatedConcept |
event causation
ⓘ
mental anomalism ⓘ supervenience ⓘ token physicalism ⓘ |
| yearProposed | 1970 ⓘ |
Referenced by (3)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.