Mental Events
E289482
"Mental Events" is a seminal 1970 paper by philosopher Donald Davidson that develops his influential theory of anomalous monism, arguing that mental events are identical with physical events while lacking strict psychophysical laws.
All labels observed (2)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Mental Events canonical | 1 |
| Mental Events Revisited | 1 |
Statements (45)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
academic article
ⓘ
philosophical paper ⓘ |
| arguesAgainst |
Cartesian dualism
ⓘ
reductive materialism ⓘ type identity theory ⓘ |
| author | Donald Davidson ⓘ |
| claims |
mental events are identical with physical events
ⓘ
mental events can be causes and effects of physical events ⓘ there are no strict psychophysical laws ⓘ |
| countryOfOrigin |
United States of America
ⓘ
surface form:
United States
|
| denies | existence of strict laws connecting mental predicates with physical predicates ⓘ |
| field |
metaphysics
ⓘ
philosophy of mind ⓘ |
| firstPublishedIn | Experience and Theory (edited volume) ⓘ |
| hasImpactOn |
metaphysics of causation
ⓘ
philosophy of action ⓘ philosophy of psychology ⓘ |
| hasKeyTerm |
event identity
ⓘ
supervenience of the mental on the physical ⓘ |
| hasSection |
The Anomalism of the Mental
ⓘ
The Nomological Character of Causality ⓘ The Principle of Causal Interaction ⓘ |
| influenced |
David Lewis
ⓘ
Jaegwon Kim ⓘ Jerry Fodor ⓘ contemporary debates on mental causation ⓘ |
| influencedBy |
Elizabeth Anscombe
ⓘ
surface form:
G. E. M. Anscombe
Willard Van Orman Quine ⓘ
surface form:
W. V. O. Quine
logical behaviorism ⓘ logical positivism ⓘ |
| introducesConcept | anomalism of the mental ⓘ |
| isConsidered | seminal work in philosophy of mind ⓘ |
| isFrequentlyAnthologized | true ⓘ |
| language | English ⓘ |
| mainTopic |
anomalous monism
ⓘ
mental causation ⓘ mind–body problem ⓘ token identity theory ⓘ |
| philosophicalPositionType | non-reductive physicalism ⓘ |
| proposesTheory | anomalous monism ⓘ |
| publicationYear | 1970 ⓘ |
| reprintedIn | Essays on Actions and Events ⓘ |
| supportsThesis |
causal relations require strict laws at the physical level
ⓘ
every mental event has a physical description ⓘ |
| supportsView | token physicalism ⓘ |
Referenced by (2)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
this entity surface form:
Mental Events Revisited