Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education

E108703

Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education is a 1999 U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that schools receiving federal funds can be liable under Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment when they are deliberately indifferent to known acts of harassment that are severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive.

All labels observed (3)

How this entity was disambiguated

Statements (48)

Predicate Object
instanceOf Title IX case
United States Supreme Court case
appliesTo schools receiving federal financial assistance
areaOfLaw anti-discrimination law
federal education funding conditions
arguedDate 1998-11-02
citation 119 S. Ct. 1661
143 L. Ed. 2d 839
526 U.S. 629
court Supreme Court of the United States
decidedDate 1999-05-24
decisionDate 1999-05-24
dissentingOpinionBy Anthony M. Kennedy
surface form: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy

Antonin Scalia
surface form: Justice Antonin Scalia

Clarence Thomas
surface form: Justice Clarence Thomas

William H. Rehnquist
surface form: Justice William H. Rehnquist
docketNumber 97-843
fullCaseName Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education self-linksurface differs
surface form: Aurelia Davis, as next friend of LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, et al.
holding A recipient of federal education funds may be liable under Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment
Liability under Title IX requires that the funding recipient act with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment
The harassment must be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit
joinedByInMajority David H. Souter
surface form: Justice David H. Souter

John Paul Stevens
surface form: Justice John Paul Stevens

Ruth Bader Ginsburg
surface form: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Stephen G. Breyer
surface form: Justice Stephen G. Breyer
jurisdiction United States federal law
jurisprudentialImpact clarified scope of institutional liability for peer harassment under Title IX
legalIssue Title IX liability for student-on-student sexual harassment
lowerCourt United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
lowerCourtDisposition affirmed in part and reversed in part
majorityOpinionBy Sandra Day O’Connor
surface form: Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
originatingState Georgia
petitioner Aurelia Davis
plaintiffAllegation school officials were deliberately indifferent to known student-on-student sexual harassment
precedentFor Title IX
surface form: Title IX peer sexual harassment claims
relatedTo Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District
remedyDiscussed monetary damages under Title IX
requires actual knowledge of harassment by an appropriate school official
control over the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurs by the funding recipient
respondent Monroe County Board of Education
standardAnnounced deliberate indifference standard for peer harassment under Title IX
statuteInterpreted Title IX
surface form: Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
statutoryCitation 20 U.S.C. § 1681
subjectMatter civil rights law
education law
sexual harassment in schools
term October Term 1998

How these facts were elicited

Referenced by (5)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Title IX notableCase Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools precedentFor Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District relatedTo Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District subsequentCitationIn Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
this entity surface form: Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999)
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education fullCaseName Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education self-linksurface differs
this entity surface form: Aurelia Davis, as next friend of LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, et al.