social choice theory
E496859
branch of welfare economics
field of study
subfield of economics
subfield of political science
theory
Social choice theory is a field of economics and political science that studies how individual preferences can be aggregated into collective decisions or social welfare judgments.
Statements (59)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
branch of welfare economics
ⓘ
field of study ⓘ subfield of economics ⓘ subfield of political science ⓘ theory ⓘ |
| appliesTo |
committee decisions
ⓘ
elections ⓘ public decision making ⓘ public policy design ⓘ resource allocation ⓘ |
| developedBy |
Allan Gibbard
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Amartya Sen NERFINISHED ⓘ Duncan Black NERFINISHED ⓘ Hervé Moulin NERFINISHED ⓘ John Harsanyi NERFINISHED ⓘ Kenneth Arrow NERFINISHED ⓘ Mark Satterthwaite NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| hasGoal |
analysis of consistency of social choices
ⓘ
design of fair collective decision rules ⓘ reconciliation of individual and collective rationality ⓘ |
| hasKeyConcept |
Arrow's impossibility theorem
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Borda count NERFINISHED ⓘ Condorcet method NERFINISHED ⓘ Condorcet paradox NERFINISHED ⓘ Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem NERFINISHED ⓘ Pareto efficiency NERFINISHED ⓘ anonymity ⓘ dictatorship ⓘ fairness axioms ⓘ independence of irrelevant alternatives ⓘ majority rule ⓘ monotonicity ⓘ neutrality ⓘ non-dictatorship ⓘ single-peaked preferences ⓘ social choice function ⓘ social welfare function ⓘ strategy-proof mechanism ⓘ transitivity ⓘ unrestricted domain ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
game theory
ⓘ
mechanism design theory ⓘ political philosophy ⓘ welfare economics ⓘ |
| studies |
aggregation of individual preferences
ⓘ
collective decision making ⓘ collective rationality ⓘ fair division ⓘ impossibility theorems ⓘ interpersonal comparisons of welfare ⓘ judgment aggregation ⓘ manipulability of voting rules ⓘ mechanism design ⓘ preference aggregation rules ⓘ social choice functions ⓘ social welfare functions ⓘ social welfare judgments ⓘ strategy-proofness ⓘ voting systems ⓘ |
Referenced by (2)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.