Hempel's paradox

E334005

Hempel's paradox is a famous problem in the philosophy of science that challenges our intuitions about confirmation by showing how evidence seemingly unrelated to a hypothesis can still count as confirming it.

All labels observed (5)

Label Occurrences
Hempel's paradox canonical 2
Hempel's raven paradox 1
Hempel's ravens paradox 1

How this entity was disambiguated

Statements (47)

Predicate Object
instanceOf epistemological problem
philosophical paradox
problem in confirmation theory
problem in the philosophy of science
alsoKnownAs Hempel's paradox
surface form: Hempel's ravens paradox

ravens paradox
surface form: the paradox of the ravens
basedOnPrinciple Nicod's criterion that a universal generalization is confirmed by its positive instances
the equivalence condition for confirmation
challenges intuitive views about what counts as confirming evidence
simple hypothetico-deductive accounts of confirmation
concerns Hempel's paradox self-linksurface differs
surface form: the Nicod criterion

the equivalence condition for hypotheses
the logic of scientific confirmation
the relation between evidence and hypotheses
discussedIn Carl Hempel's writings on the logic of confirmation
contemporary philosophy of science textbooks
example a green apple confirming the hypothesis that all ravens are black
a white shoe confirming the hypothesis that all ravens are black
field epistemology
logic
philosophy of science
hasSolutionApproach Bayesian approaches to confirmation
contextual or relevance-based accounts of confirmation
rejection or modification of Nicod's criterion
restriction of the equivalence condition
historicalPeriod 20th-century analytic philosophy
illustrates a tension between logical principles of confirmation and intuitive judgments
counterintuitive consequences of standard confirmation theory
that evidence seemingly unrelated to a hypothesis can confirm it
that logically equivalent hypotheses should be confirmed by the same evidence
influenced debates about the nature of scientific evidence
subsequent work on formal confirmation theory
involves hypotheses about all ravens
observations of black ravens
observations of non-black non-ravens
the hypothesis 'All ravens are black'
the logically equivalent hypothesis 'All non-black things are non-ravens'
mainTopic confirmation theory
hypothesis confirmation
inductive reasoning
namedAfter Carl Hempel
surface form: Carl Gustav Hempel
relatedTo Bayesian epistemology
surface form: Bayesian confirmation theory

new riddle of induction
surface form: Goodman's new riddle of induction

inductive logic
problem of induction
raven paradox literature
status standard example in discussions of confirmation theory

How these facts were elicited

Referenced by (6)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Carl Hempel notableIdea Hempel's paradox
Hempel knownFor Hempel's paradox
subject surface form: Carl Gustav Hempel
this entity surface form: Hempel's raven paradox
Hempel's paradox alsoKnownAs Hempel's paradox
this entity surface form: Hempel's ravens paradox
Hempel's paradox concerns Hempel's paradox self-linksurface differs
this entity surface form: the Nicod criterion
ravens paradox hasAlternativeName Hempel's paradox
subject surface form: Ravens paradox
ravens paradox involvesConcept Hempel's paradox
subject surface form: Ravens paradox
this entity surface form: Nicod's criterion