securityAssumption

P35052

predicate

Indicates that a particular condition, behavior, or property is presumed to hold true for security purposes within a system or protocol.

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All labels observed (2)

Label	Occurrences
securityAssumption canonical	15
securityConditionAtTimeOfAttack	1

Description generation (PDg)

The one-sentence description above was generated by prompting gpt-5.1 with the predicate name and this instruction.

Instruction

Given a predicate that represents a relationship or action between entities, generate a one-sentence description explaining its meaning.  
# Instructions
Focus on describing the relationship, not the entities themselves. 
# Response Format
Begin the description with \' Indicates...\'

Input

Predicate: securityAssumption

Generated description

Indicates that a particular condition, behavior, or property is presumed to hold true for security purposes within a system or protocol.

Sample triples (16)

Subject	Object
Poly1305	computational hardness of forging MAC without key ⓘ
Blum–Blum–Shub pseudorandom number generator	factoring Blum integers is hard ⓘ
FFDHE groups	hardness of the discrete logarithm problem ⓘ
FFDHE groups	hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem ⓘ
Curve25519-based schemes	elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem ⓘ
AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305	ChaCha20 pseudorandomness ⓘ
AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305	Poly1305 unforgeability with one-time keys ⓘ
paper "Chaffing and Winnowing: Confidentiality without Encryption" surface form: Chaffing and Winnowing: Confidentiality without Encryption	MAC is unforgeable without the secret key ⓘ
United States Marine Corps barracks surface form: United States Marine Corps barracks (Beirut)	rules of engagement restricted loaded weapons and defensive measures via predicate surface "securityConditionAtTimeOfAttack" ⓘ
zk-SNARKs	knowledge of exponent assumption ⓘ
zk-SNARKs	discrete logarithm hardness ⓘ
zk-SNARKs	cryptographic pairing hardness assumptions ⓘ
secp256k1	hardness of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem ⓘ
Fiat–Shamir heuristic	hash function modeled as random oracle ⓘ
HC-256	hardness of distinguishing keystream from random ⓘ
HChaCha20 to derive subkey from main key and first 128 bits of nonce surface form: HChaCha20	security of ChaCha20 core function ⓘ