Gödel–Schmidt example

E949471

Kripkean thought experiment example in philosophy of language philosophical thought experiment

The Gödel–Schmidt example is a thought experiment from Saul Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity* used to illustrate issues about reference, proper names, and the distinction between sense and reference in the philosophy of language.

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Statements (46)

Predicate	Object
instanceOf	Kripkean thought experiment ⓘ example in philosophy of language ⓘ philosophical thought experiment ⓘ
appearsIn	Naming and Necessity NERFINISHED ⓘ
associatedWith	Kripke’s critique of Frege–Russell descriptivism ⓘ direct reference theory ⓘ
citedBy	commentaries on Kripke’s Naming and Necessity ⓘ literature on direct reference ⓘ literature on semantic externalism ⓘ
contrastsWith	Fregean sense-reference theory ⓘ Russellian descriptivism about names ⓘ
hasAuthor	Saul Kripke NERFINISHED ⓘ
hasContext	20th-century philosophy of language ⓘ analytic philosophy ⓘ
hasKeyClaim	reference of a proper name is not determined by a descriptive condition known by the speaker ⓘ speakers can successfully refer even when their associated descriptions are false ⓘ the name ‘Gödel’ would still refer to Gödel even if Schmidt had proved the incompleteness theorems ⓘ
hasPurpose	to challenge descriptivist accounts of proper names ⓘ to separate epistemic access from semantic reference ⓘ to support a causal theory of reference ⓘ
illustrates	distinction between sense and reference ⓘ epistemic versus metaphysical necessity ⓘ issues about reference ⓘ problems for descriptivist theories of names ⓘ rigid designation ⓘ use of proper names ⓘ
involvesCharacter	Kurt Gödel NERFINISHED ⓘ Schmidt NERFINISHED ⓘ
involvesConcept	Millian theory of names ⓘ causal-historical chain of reference ⓘ descriptivist theory of names ⓘ misattributed description ⓘ reference fixing ⓘ semantic externalism ⓘ
language	English ⓘ
namedAfter	Kurt Gödel NERFINISHED ⓘ Schmidt (fictional or hypothetical mathematician) NERFINISHED ⓘ
supportsView	names are rigid designators ⓘ semantic content of a name is its bearer ⓘ
taughtIn	graduate seminars on reference and modality ⓘ introductory philosophy of language courses ⓘ
usedIn	Kripkean semantics NERFINISHED ⓘ causal theory of reference ⓘ metaphysics of reference ⓘ philosophy of language ⓘ theory of proper names ⓘ

Referenced by (1)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Naming and Necessity → hasExample → Gödel–Schmidt example ⓘ