median voter theorem
E833552
The median voter theorem is a principle in political science and economics stating that in majority-rule elections with single-peaked preferences, candidates or parties tend to converge on the policy position preferred by the median voter.
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
result in social choice theory
ⓘ
theorem in political science ⓘ theorem in public choice theory ⓘ |
| assumes |
candidates are office-motivated
ⓘ
complete information about voter preferences ⓘ full voter participation or fixed electorate ⓘ majority rule voting ⓘ sincere voting ⓘ single-peaked preferences ⓘ two candidates or parties ⓘ unidimensional policy space ⓘ |
| conclusion |
candidates converge to median voter position
ⓘ
median voter is decisive under majority rule ⓘ policy outcome equals ideal point of median voter ⓘ |
| coreConceptOf |
Downsian model of electoral competition
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
spatial models of voting ⓘ |
| criticizedFor |
ignoring ideological or policy-motivated candidates
ⓘ
limited empirical support in some contexts ⓘ oversimplifying voter preferences ⓘ |
| describes | equilibrium policy choice under majority rule ⓘ |
| field |
economics
ⓘ
political science ⓘ public choice ⓘ social choice theory ⓘ |
| hasKeyConcept |
Nash equilibrium in platforms
ⓘ
ideal point ⓘ median voter ⓘ policy space ⓘ |
| implies |
centripetal competition in two-party systems
ⓘ
extreme platforms are not stable under majority rule ⓘ moderate policies in equilibrium ⓘ |
| limitation |
may fail with more than two serious candidates
ⓘ
may fail with multidimensional policy spaces ⓘ may fail with non-single-peaked preferences ⓘ sensitive to strategic voting ⓘ sensitive to turnout differences ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Black’s median voter result ⓘ Condorcet winner NERFINISHED ⓘ Hotelling–Downs model NERFINISHED ⓘ single-peaked preference domain ⓘ |
| usedIn |
analysis of electoral competition
ⓘ
analysis of party positioning ⓘ direct democracy analysis ⓘ local public finance ⓘ models of redistribution ⓘ models of representative democracy ⓘ public economics ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.