median voter theorem
E833552
The median voter theorem is a principle in political science and economics stating that in majority-rule elections with single-peaked preferences, candidates or parties tend to converge on the policy position preferred by the median voter.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| median voter theorem canonical | 1 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T9986252 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
Target entity: median voter theorem Context triple: [Hotelling’s law, relatedTo, median voter theorem]
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A.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory showing that no voting system can convert individual preferences into a collective ranking while simultaneously satisfying a set of seemingly reasonable fairness criteria.
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B.
Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a fundamental result in social choice theory showing that every reasonable voting system with at least three options is susceptible to strategic manipulation by voters.
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C.
Condorcet paradox
The Condorcet paradox is a voting theory phenomenon where collective preferences can become cyclic and inconsistent, even when individual voters’ preferences are perfectly rational and transitive.
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D.
Condorcet criterion
The Condorcet criterion is a voting system standard requiring that if a candidate would win every head-to-head contest against each other candidate, that candidate must be the overall election winner.
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E.
Swing Vote
Swing Vote is a 2008 American political comedy-drama film in which a single man's vote unexpectedly decides a deadlocked U.S. presidential election.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
Target entity: median voter theorem Target entity description: The median voter theorem is a principle in political science and economics stating that in majority-rule elections with single-peaked preferences, candidates or parties tend to converge on the policy position preferred by the median voter.
-
A.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory showing that no voting system can convert individual preferences into a collective ranking while simultaneously satisfying a set of seemingly reasonable fairness criteria.
-
B.
Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a fundamental result in social choice theory showing that every reasonable voting system with at least three options is susceptible to strategic manipulation by voters.
-
C.
Condorcet paradox
The Condorcet paradox is a voting theory phenomenon where collective preferences can become cyclic and inconsistent, even when individual voters’ preferences are perfectly rational and transitive.
-
D.
Condorcet criterion
The Condorcet criterion is a voting system standard requiring that if a candidate would win every head-to-head contest against each other candidate, that candidate must be the overall election winner.
-
E.
Swing Vote
Swing Vote is a 2008 American political comedy-drama film in which a single man's vote unexpectedly decides a deadlocked U.S. presidential election.
- F. None of above. chosen
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
result in social choice theory
ⓘ
theorem in political science ⓘ theorem in public choice theory ⓘ |
| assumes |
candidates are office-motivated
ⓘ
complete information about voter preferences ⓘ full voter participation or fixed electorate ⓘ majority rule voting ⓘ sincere voting ⓘ single-peaked preferences ⓘ two candidates or parties ⓘ unidimensional policy space ⓘ |
| conclusion |
candidates converge to median voter position
ⓘ
median voter is decisive under majority rule ⓘ policy outcome equals ideal point of median voter ⓘ |
| coreConceptOf |
Downsian model of electoral competition
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
spatial models of voting ⓘ |
| criticizedFor |
ignoring ideological or policy-motivated candidates
ⓘ
limited empirical support in some contexts ⓘ oversimplifying voter preferences ⓘ |
| describes | equilibrium policy choice under majority rule ⓘ |
| field |
economics
ⓘ
political science ⓘ public choice ⓘ social choice theory ⓘ |
| hasKeyConcept |
Nash equilibrium in platforms
ⓘ
ideal point ⓘ median voter ⓘ policy space ⓘ |
| implies |
centripetal competition in two-party systems
ⓘ
extreme platforms are not stable under majority rule ⓘ moderate policies in equilibrium ⓘ |
| limitation |
may fail with more than two serious candidates
ⓘ
may fail with multidimensional policy spaces ⓘ may fail with non-single-peaked preferences ⓘ sensitive to strategic voting ⓘ sensitive to turnout differences ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Black’s median voter result ⓘ Condorcet winner NERFINISHED ⓘ Hotelling–Downs model NERFINISHED ⓘ single-peaked preference domain ⓘ |
| usedIn |
analysis of electoral competition
ⓘ
analysis of party positioning ⓘ direct democracy analysis ⓘ local public finance ⓘ models of redistribution ⓘ models of representative democracy ⓘ public economics ⓘ |
How these facts were elicited
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Subject: median voter theorem Description of subject: The median voter theorem is a principle in political science and economics stating that in majority-rule elections with single-peaked preferences, candidates or parties tend to converge on the policy position preferred by the median voter.
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.