Shapley–Gale theorem
E612745
The Shapley–Gale theorem is a foundational result in cooperative game theory that characterizes stable outcomes in assignment and matching problems, underpinning much of modern market design and matching theory.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Shapley–Gale theorem canonical | 1 |
Statements (25)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
result in cooperative game theory
ⓘ
theorem ⓘ |
| appliesTo |
assignment games
ⓘ
two-sided matching markets ⓘ |
| assumption | transferable utility in assignment games ⓘ |
| characterizes | stable matchings ⓘ |
| concerns |
assignment problems
ⓘ
matching problems ⓘ stable outcomes ⓘ |
| coreIdea | stable outcomes correspond to core allocations in assignment games ⓘ |
| field |
cooperative game theory
ⓘ
market design ⓘ matching theory ⓘ |
| framework | cooperative games with transferable utility ⓘ |
| guarantees | existence of stable outcomes in certain matching models ⓘ |
| influenced |
design of matching mechanisms
ⓘ
theory of stable matchings ⓘ |
| namedAfter |
David Gale
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Lloyd Shapley NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| provides | characterization of the core in assignment games ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
Gale–Shapley algorithm
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Shapley–Shubik assignment game NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| usedFor | analysis of matching markets with monetary transfers ⓘ |
| usedIn |
matching theory
ⓘ
modern market design ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.