verification principle
E118281
criterion of cognitive significance
doctrine of logical positivism
philosophical principle
theory of meaning
The verification principle is a central doctrine of logical positivism claiming that a statement is meaningful only if it can be empirically verified or is analytically true.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| verification principle canonical | 1 |
Statements (49)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
criterion of cognitive significance
ⓘ
doctrine of logical positivism ⓘ philosophical principle ⓘ theory of meaning ⓘ |
| aimsTo | distinguish meaningful statements from meaningless ones ⓘ |
| alsoKnownAs |
principle of verification
ⓘ
verifiability principle ⓘ |
| appliesTo |
empirical propositions
ⓘ
logical truths ⓘ |
| associatedWith |
A. J. Ayer
ⓘ
Moritz Schlick ⓘ Rudolf Carnap ⓘ Vienna Circle ⓘ |
| centralTo |
logical positivism
ⓘ
surface form:
logical empiricism
logical positivism ⓘ |
| concerns |
analytic truth
ⓘ
cognitive significance ⓘ empirical verification ⓘ meaningfulness of statements ⓘ |
| criticizedBy |
Karl Popper
ⓘ
falsificationism ⓘ
surface form:
Karl Popper's falsificationism
Willard Van Orman Quine ⓘ
surface form:
W. V. O. Quine
|
| criticizedFor |
excluding scientific theoretical statements
ⓘ
overly strict criterion of meaning ⓘ self-referential incoherence ⓘ |
| excludes | non-empirical metaphysical propositions from cognitive meaning ⓘ |
| formulatedIn | 20th century ⓘ |
| historicallyInfluentialIn |
20th-century philosophy of language
ⓘ
20th-century philosophy of science ⓘ |
| implies | many traditional metaphysical claims lack cognitive meaning ⓘ |
| influencedBy |
David Hume
ⓘ
early analytic philosophy ⓘ empiricism ⓘ logical analysis ⓘ |
| legacy | shaped debates about meaning, reference, and scientific language ⓘ |
| modifiedInto |
principle of confirmability
ⓘ
weak verification principle ⓘ |
| notablyPresentedIn |
Language, Truth and Logic
ⓘ
surface form:
A. J. Ayer's "Language, Truth and Logic"
|
| relatedTo |
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”
ⓘ
surface form:
analytic–synthetic distinction
falsifiability criterion ⓘ meaning as use debates in philosophy of language ⓘ |
| requires |
analytic truth for logical or mathematical statements
ⓘ
empirical testability for factual statements ⓘ |
| statesThat | a statement is meaningful only if it is empirically verifiable or analytically true ⓘ |
| status | largely rejected in contemporary analytic philosophy ⓘ |
| usedTo |
reject aesthetic statements as cognitively meaningful propositions
ⓘ
reject ethical statements as cognitively meaningful propositions ⓘ reject metaphysical statements as cognitively meaningless ⓘ reject theological statements as cognitively meaningless ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.