Triple
T3081242
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | Jean Tirole |
E64259
|
entity |
| Predicate | notableWork |
P4
|
FINISHED |
| Object |
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a foundational economics book that develops a rigorous principal–agent framework for designing optimal contracts and regulatory mechanisms in public procurement and regulated industries.
|
E324673
|
NE FINISHED |
How this triple was built (4 steps)
Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.
NER
Named-entity recognition
gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) | Statement: [Jean Tirole, notableWork, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)]
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) Context triple: [Jean Tirole, notableWork, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)]
-
A.
Walrasian market-clearing framework
The Walrasian market-clearing framework is a general equilibrium model in which perfectly competitive markets continuously adjust prices so that supply equals demand in all markets simultaneously.
-
B.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
-
C.
Rubinstein bargaining model
The Rubinstein bargaining model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that analyzes how two parties reach agreement over time through alternating offers under the influence of impatience and strategic delay.
-
D.
Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
"Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy" is an influential economic paper that analyzes how different monetary policy regimes and the credibility of policymakers affect inflation and output outcomes.
-
E.
Coase theorem
The Coase theorem is an economic theory stating that if property rights are well-defined and transaction costs are negligible, private bargaining will lead to an efficient allocation of resources regardless of the initial assignment of rights.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NEDg
Description generation
gpt-5.1
Instruction
Generate a one-sentence description of the target entity. You are given a context triple in the form (subject, predicate, object), where the object is the target entity. # Instructions Use the triple to infer relevant information about the entity. Describe the entity based on what is most defining, well-known. Avoid repeating the information from the triple, unless really essential. # Response Format Return only the sentence: "Description: [one-sentence description of the target entity]"
Input
Entity: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) Triple: [Jean Tirole, notableWork, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)]
Generated description
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a foundational economics book that develops a rigorous principal–agent framework for designing optimal contracts and regulatory mechanisms in public procurement and regulated industries.
NED2
Entity disambiguation (via description)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) Target entity description: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a foundational economics book that develops a rigorous principal–agent framework for designing optimal contracts and regulatory mechanisms in public procurement and regulated industries.
-
A.
Walrasian market-clearing framework
The Walrasian market-clearing framework is a general equilibrium model in which perfectly competitive markets continuously adjust prices so that supply equals demand in all markets simultaneously.
-
B.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
-
C.
Rubinstein bargaining model
The Rubinstein bargaining model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that analyzes how two parties reach agreement over time through alternating offers under the influence of impatience and strategic delay.
-
D.
Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
"Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy" is an influential economic paper that analyzes how different monetary policy regimes and the credibility of policymakers affect inflation and output outcomes.
-
E.
Coase theorem
The Coase theorem is an economic theory stating that if property rights are well-defined and transaction costs are negligible, private bargaining will lead to an efficient allocation of resources regardless of the initial assignment of rights.
- F. None of above. chosen
Provenance (5 batches)
The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.
| Step | Stage | Batch ID | Status | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| creating | Elicitation | batch_69ad857bb4c88190a4cf27893fcabed8 |
completed | March 8, 2026, 2:19 p.m. |
| NER | Named-entity recognition | batch_69ada1aaf6d48190af4f9106965589b0 |
completed | March 8, 2026, 4:19 p.m. |
| NED1 | Entity disambiguation (via context triple) | batch_69b1f89443a4819091dafc560b45cc26 |
completed | March 11, 2026, 11:19 p.m. |
| NEDg | Description generation | batch_69b1f93d5b208190835093f453fd33ab |
completed | March 11, 2026, 11:22 p.m. |
| NED2 | Entity disambiguation (via description) | batch_69b1f9ea9b908190a86e2b79a89e0283 |
completed | March 11, 2026, 11:25 p.m. |
Created at: March 8, 2026, 3:03 p.m.