A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)

E324673

A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a foundational economics book that develops a rigorous principal–agent framework for designing optimal contracts and regulatory mechanisms in public procurement and regulated industries.

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Predicate Object
instanceOf book
economics book
author Jean Tirole
Jean-Jacques Laffont
countryOfPublication United States of America
surface form: United States
describesConcept adverse selection in regulation
auction design for procurement
incentive-compatible regulation
information rents
moral hazard in regulation
screening contracts
field contract theory
economics
industrial organization
microeconomics
principal–agent theory
public economics
regulatory economics
focusesOn design of optimal contracts
public procurement mechanisms
regulation of natural monopolies
regulation under asymmetric information
regulatory mechanisms
hasTheoreticalFramework mechanism design framework
principal–agent framework
influencedField contract theory
industrial organization
public procurement policy
regulatory economics
language English
mainSubject asymmetric information
incentive theory
mechanism design
optimal contracts
procurement
public procurement
regulated industries
regulation
notableFor formal analysis of optimal regulatory contracts
rigorous treatment of principal–agent problems in regulation
publicationDecade 1990s
publisher MIT Press
targetAudience graduate students in economics
policy makers in regulation
researchers in industrial organization

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Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Jean Tirole notableWork A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
Tirole notableWork A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
subject surface form: Jean Tirole