Triple
T19494626
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | Prêt à Voter |
E487737
|
entity |
| Predicate | instanceOf |
P0
|
FINISHED |
| Object | cryptographic voting protocol |
C16852
|
CONCEPT FINISHED |
How this triple was built (1 step)
Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.
CD
Concept disambiguation
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target class: cryptographic voting protocol Context triple: [Prêt à Voter, instanceOf, cryptographic voting protocol]
-
A.
cryptographic voting system
chosen
A cryptographic voting system is a secure, privacy-preserving election mechanism that uses cryptographic protocols to ensure ballot secrecy, voter authentication, integrity of tallies, and verifiable results without revealing individual votes.
-
B.
end-to-end auditable voting scheme
An end-to-end auditable voting scheme is a voting system that allows each voter and independent observers to verify, from ballot casting through tallying, that all recorded votes are correctly included in the final result without revealing how any individual voted.
-
C.
cryptographic protocol
A cryptographic protocol is a precisely defined sequence of operations and message exchanges that uses cryptographic primitives to achieve security goals such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation between parties.
-
D.
cryptographic protocol framework
A cryptographic protocol framework is a structured set of tools, abstractions, and rules that enables the design, specification, analysis, and implementation of secure communication protocols.
-
E.
cryptographic protocol message
A cryptographic protocol message is a structured unit of data exchanged between parties in a cryptographic protocol, containing information such as identifiers, nonces, keys, and signatures to achieve security goals like confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.
- F. None of above.
Provenance (1 batch)
The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.
| Step | Stage | Batch ID | Status | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| creating | Elicitation | batch_69d8e8d9d1c88190b01cd78b8be49384 |
completed | April 10, 2026, 12:11 p.m. |
Created at: April 10, 2026, 1:40 p.m.