Prêt à Voter
E487737
Prêt à Voter is an end-to-end verifiable voting system that uses randomized candidate orders and cryptographic techniques to allow voters to confirm their vote was counted correctly without revealing how they voted.
Statements (50)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
cryptographic voting protocol
ⓘ
end-to-end verifiable voting system ⓘ |
| aimsTo |
allow voters to verify their vote is included in the tally
ⓘ
prevent voters from proving how they voted ⓘ provide individual verifiability for each voter ⓘ provide universal verifiability of the election outcome ⓘ |
| comparedTo |
Helios voting system
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Punchscan NERFINISHED ⓘ Scantegrity NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| developedBy |
Peter Ryan
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
collaborators in the electronic voting research community ⓘ |
| field |
applied cryptography
ⓘ
computer security ⓘ electronic voting ⓘ |
| hasComponent |
ballot form with randomized candidate list
ⓘ
encrypted receipt ⓘ mixing and decryption phase ⓘ public bulletin board ⓘ separate strip for marking the vote ⓘ |
| hasDocumentation | academic research papers ⓘ |
| hasPrimaryFeature |
end-to-end verifiability
ⓘ
randomized candidate order on each ballot ⓘ receipt-freeness goal ⓘ voter-verifiable paper audit trail ⓘ |
| hasProperty |
ballot secrecy is preserved under standard assumptions
ⓘ
supports risk-limiting audits in some variants ⓘ tally can be recomputed and verified by observers ⓘ voter can check presence of their encrypted vote on a public bulletin board ⓘ |
| hasSecurityGoal |
coercion resistance
ⓘ
public verifiability of decryption and mixing ⓘ robustness against ballot stuffing ⓘ robustness against vote manipulation ⓘ |
| hasUseCase |
governmental elections (pilot trials)
ⓘ
organizational and academic elections ⓘ |
| hasVariant |
Prêt à Voter with homomorphic tallying
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Prêt à Voter with re-encryption mix-nets ⓘ |
| inspired | later end-to-end verifiable voting schemes ⓘ |
| introducedIn | early 2000s ⓘ |
| isDiscussedIn | literature on verifiable elections and e-voting standards ⓘ |
| nameLanguage | French ⓘ |
| nameMeaning | ready to vote ⓘ |
| requires |
procedures for generating and auditing randomized ballots
ⓘ
trusted setup for cryptographic keys ⓘ |
| securityDependsOn |
correct implementation of mix-nets and proofs
ⓘ
integrity of the public bulletin board ⓘ |
| uses |
cryptographic commitments
ⓘ
mix-nets ⓘ public-key cryptography ⓘ randomized candidate permutations ⓘ zero-knowledge proofs ⓘ |
Referenced by (2)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.