Naor–Yung encryption paradigm
E831745
The Naor–Yung encryption paradigm is a foundational cryptographic framework that uses double encryption and zero-knowledge proofs to transform semantically secure public-key schemes into ones secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Statements (45)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
cryptographic paradigm
ⓘ
public-key encryption construction ⓘ |
| aimsToPrevent |
ciphertext malleability
ⓘ
decryption oracle abuse in CCA attacks ⓘ |
| appliesTo | public-key encryption schemes ⓘ |
| assumes |
existence of semantically secure public-key encryption
ⓘ
existence of zero-knowledge proofs for NP ⓘ |
| category | encryption paradigm ⓘ |
| ciphertextStructure | pair of ciphertexts plus proof ⓘ |
| constructionStep |
attach a zero-knowledge proof that the two ciphertexts encrypt the same plaintext
ⓘ
encrypt the same plaintext under the public key twice independently ⓘ |
| decryptionCondition | decrypt only if the proof verifies ⓘ |
| ensures |
integrity of ciphertexts under CCA
ⓘ
non-malleability under chosen-ciphertext attack ⓘ |
| field |
cryptography
ⓘ
public-key cryptography ⓘ |
| goal |
CCA security
ⓘ
chosen-ciphertext security ⓘ |
| hasAuthors |
Moni Naor
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Moti Yung NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| influenced |
CCA-secure encryption scheme design
ⓘ
cryptographic protocol design ⓘ |
| inputProperty |
IND-CPA security
ⓘ
semantic security ⓘ |
| introducedInContextOf | public-key cryptosystems secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks ⓘ |
| namedAfter |
Moni Naor
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Moti Yung NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| outputProperty |
IND-CCA security
ⓘ
security against chosen-ciphertext attacks ⓘ |
| property |
black-box use of underlying encryption scheme
ⓘ
generic transformation from IND-CPA to IND-CCA ⓘ |
| relatedConcept |
Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Fujisaki–Okamoto transform NERFINISHED ⓘ non-malleable encryption ⓘ zero-knowledge proof systems ⓘ |
| reliesOn |
semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme
ⓘ
soundness of zero-knowledge proofs ⓘ zero-knowledge proof of equality of plaintexts ⓘ |
| securityModel |
IND-CCA2
ⓘ
adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack ⓘ |
| typicalProofTool |
hybrid argument
GENERATED
ⓘ
simulation of zero-knowledge proofs GENERATED ⓘ |
| usesTechnique |
double encryption
ⓘ
zero-knowledge proofs ⓘ |
| verificationStep | check validity of the zero-knowledge proof ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.