simulation argument
E708978
The simulation argument is a philosophical hypothesis suggesting that advanced civilizations could create highly realistic computer simulations of conscious beings, raising the possibility that our own reality might be such a simulation.
Statements (52)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
hypothesis
ⓘ
philosophical argument ⓘ thought experiment ⓘ |
| assumes |
future civilizations may have enormous computing resources
ⓘ
it is possible in principle to simulate human-like minds on computers ⓘ |
| conclusionType | disjunctive conclusion ⓘ |
| coreClaim | at least one of three propositions about future civilizations and simulations is true ⓘ |
| criticizedFor |
potential misuse of probabilistic reasoning
ⓘ
reliance on speculative assumptions about future technology ⓘ uncertainty about appropriate reference class of observers ⓘ |
| distinctionFrom | it does not directly claim we are in a simulation but that one of three propositions is true ⓘ |
| field |
ethics
ⓘ
metaphysics ⓘ philosophy of mind ⓘ philosophy of religion ⓘ philosophy of science ⓘ philosophy of technology ⓘ |
| hasAlternativeName | Bostrom's simulation argument ⓘ |
| implies |
if many ancestor simulations are run then simulated observers vastly outnumber non-simulated observers
ⓘ
if simulated observers vastly outnumber non-simulated observers then a randomly selected observer is probably simulated ⓘ |
| influenced | public discussions about whether reality is a simulation ⓘ |
| inspiredDebateIn |
analytic philosophy
ⓘ
popular science writing ⓘ technology and AI discourse ⓘ |
| involvesConcept |
Bayesian reasoning
ⓘ
anthropic reasoning ⓘ computationalism about mind ⓘ observer selection effects ⓘ posthuman computing power ⓘ reference class ⓘ self-locating belief ⓘ simulation hypothesis ⓘ substrate independence of consciousness ⓘ |
| oftenConfusedWith | simulation hypothesis ⓘ |
| premise |
almost all civilizations at our level of technological development go extinct before reaching posthuman stage
ⓘ
posthuman civilizations are extremely unlikely to run significant numbers of ancestor simulations ⓘ we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation ⓘ |
| proposedBy | Nick Bostrom NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| publicationYear | 2003 ⓘ |
| publishedIn | Philosophical Quarterly NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
Boltzmann brain problem
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Matrix-style virtual reality ⓘ brain in a vat ⓘ skeptical hypotheses ⓘ |
| topic |
ancestor simulations
ⓘ
computer simulations of conscious beings ⓘ consciousness in artificial environments ⓘ nature of reality ⓘ posthuman civilizations ⓘ probability of living in a simulation ⓘ technological singularity ⓘ transhumanism ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.