Sleeping Beauty problem
E679749
The Sleeping Beauty problem is a famous philosophical and probabilistic puzzle about self-locating belief, asking how an agent should update their credences when they are uncertain about both outcomes and their own temporal location.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Sleeping Beauty problem canonical | 1 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T7657943 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Sleeping Beauty problem Context triple: [Observational selection effects and probability, mainSubject, Sleeping Beauty problem]
-
A.
Forever Undecided
Forever Undecided is a logic puzzle book by Raymond Smullyan that playfully explores Gödel’s incompleteness theorems through self-referential riddles and dialogues.
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B.
St. Petersburg paradox
The St. Petersburg paradox is a famous problem in probability theory and economics that highlights how a lottery with an infinite expected payoff can still attract only a finite price from rational gamblers, challenging traditional notions of expected value and decision-making under risk.
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C.
Happy Ending problem
The Happy Ending problem is a famous combinatorial geometry question that investigates the minimum number of points in general position in the plane needed to guarantee the existence of a convex polygon with a given number of vertices.
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D.
Ellsberg paradox
The Ellsberg paradox is a famous problem in decision theory and economics that demonstrates how people’s choices often violate expected utility theory due to ambiguity aversion.
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E.
Sorites paradox
The Sorites paradox is a classic philosophical puzzle about vagueness that questions when the gradual removal or addition of small parts leads to a significant change, such as when a heap of sand stops being a heap.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NED2
Entity disambiguation (via description)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Sleeping Beauty problem Target entity description: The Sleeping Beauty problem is a famous philosophical and probabilistic puzzle about self-locating belief, asking how an agent should update their credences when they are uncertain about both outcomes and their own temporal location.
-
A.
Forever Undecided
Forever Undecided is a logic puzzle book by Raymond Smullyan that playfully explores Gödel’s incompleteness theorems through self-referential riddles and dialogues.
-
B.
St. Petersburg paradox
The St. Petersburg paradox is a famous problem in probability theory and economics that highlights how a lottery with an infinite expected payoff can still attract only a finite price from rational gamblers, challenging traditional notions of expected value and decision-making under risk.
-
C.
Happy Ending problem
The Happy Ending problem is a famous combinatorial geometry question that investigates the minimum number of points in general position in the plane needed to guarantee the existence of a convex polygon with a given number of vertices.
-
D.
Ellsberg paradox
The Ellsberg paradox is a famous problem in decision theory and economics that demonstrates how people’s choices often violate expected utility theory due to ambiguity aversion.
-
E.
Sorites paradox
The Sorites paradox is a classic philosophical puzzle about vagueness that questions when the gradual removal or addition of small parts leads to a significant change, such as when a heap of sand stops being a heap.
- F. None of above. chosen
Statements (56)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
philosophical puzzle
ⓘ
probability puzzle ⓘ self-locating belief problem ⓘ thought experiment ⓘ |
| associatedWith |
Adam Elga
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Bas van Fraassen NERFINISHED ⓘ Brian Weatherson NERFINISHED ⓘ David Lewis NERFINISHED ⓘ Ilan Meirav NERFINISHED ⓘ Nick Bostrom NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| debateFocus |
Dutch book arguments against thirders
ⓘ
compatibility of thirder position with reflection principle ⓘ diachronic Dutch book arguments against halfers ⓘ how to treat indexical information in Bayesian updating ⓘ whether Beauty should condition on being awake ⓘ whether awakenings should be treated as separate evidence instances ⓘ |
| field |
Bayesian epistemology
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
decision theory NERFINISHED ⓘ epistemology ⓘ formal epistemology ⓘ philosophy of mind ⓘ philosophy of probability ⓘ |
| halferPositionClaim | Beauty's credence in heads upon awakening should be 1/2 ⓘ |
| hasSetupElement |
Beauty does not know which day it is upon awakening
ⓘ
Beauty is asked for her credence that the coin landed heads ⓘ Beauty knows the experimental protocol in advance ⓘ additional awakening on Tuesday if the coin lands tails ⓘ awakening on Monday regardless of coin outcome ⓘ fair coin toss on Sunday ⓘ memory erasure between awakenings ⓘ no additional awakening on Tuesday if the coin lands heads ⓘ |
| involvesConcept |
Bayesian updating
ⓘ
anthropic reasoning ⓘ centered worlds ⓘ conditionalization ⓘ de se belief ⓘ diachronic rationality ⓘ evidential selection effects ⓘ imprecise probabilities ⓘ indexical information ⓘ reflection principle ⓘ self-locating belief ⓘ self-locating evidence ⓘ |
| mainQuestion | What credence should Sleeping Beauty assign to the proposition that a fair coin landed heads upon awakening? ⓘ |
| notablePublication |
Adam Elga's 2000 paper "Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem"
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
David Lewis's 2001 paper "Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga" NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| relatedProblem |
Doomsday argument
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Monty Hall problem NERFINISHED ⓘ anthropic principle NERFINISHED ⓘ duplication thought experiments ⓘ reflection paradoxes ⓘ self-indication assumption ⓘ self-sampling assumption ⓘ |
| standardAnswer |
halfer position
ⓘ
thirder position ⓘ |
| thirderPositionClaim | Beauty's credence in heads upon awakening should be 1/3 ⓘ |
How these facts were elicited
The pipeline generated the facts above by prompting gpt-5.1 with this entity's name + description and the instruction below.
Instruction
You are a knowledge base construction expert. Given a subject entity and a description of it, return factual statements that you know for the subject as a JSON list of dictionaries(triples), where keys must be "subject", "predicate" and "object". The number of facts may be very high, between 25 to 50 or more, for very popular subjects. For less popular subjects, the number of facts can be very low, like 5 or 10. # Requirements - If you don't know the subject at all, return an empty list. - If the subject is not a named entity, return an empty list. - Include at least one triple where predicate is "instanceOf". - Do not get too wordy. - Separate several objects into multiple triples with one object.
Input
Subject: Sleeping Beauty problem Description of subject: The Sleeping Beauty problem is a famous philosophical and probabilistic puzzle about self-locating belief, asking how an agent should update their credences when they are uncertain about both outcomes and their own temporal location.
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.