Sleeping Beauty problem
E679749
The Sleeping Beauty problem is a famous philosophical and probabilistic puzzle about self-locating belief, asking how an agent should update their credences when they are uncertain about both outcomes and their own temporal location.
Statements (56)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
philosophical puzzle
ⓘ
probability puzzle ⓘ self-locating belief problem ⓘ thought experiment ⓘ |
| associatedWith |
Adam Elga
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Bas van Fraassen NERFINISHED ⓘ Brian Weatherson NERFINISHED ⓘ David Lewis NERFINISHED ⓘ Ilan Meirav NERFINISHED ⓘ Nick Bostrom NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| debateFocus |
Dutch book arguments against thirders
ⓘ
compatibility of thirder position with reflection principle ⓘ diachronic Dutch book arguments against halfers ⓘ how to treat indexical information in Bayesian updating ⓘ whether Beauty should condition on being awake ⓘ whether awakenings should be treated as separate evidence instances ⓘ |
| field |
Bayesian epistemology
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
decision theory NERFINISHED ⓘ epistemology ⓘ formal epistemology ⓘ philosophy of mind ⓘ philosophy of probability ⓘ |
| halferPositionClaim | Beauty's credence in heads upon awakening should be 1/2 ⓘ |
| hasSetupElement |
Beauty does not know which day it is upon awakening
ⓘ
Beauty is asked for her credence that the coin landed heads ⓘ Beauty knows the experimental protocol in advance ⓘ additional awakening on Tuesday if the coin lands tails ⓘ awakening on Monday regardless of coin outcome ⓘ fair coin toss on Sunday ⓘ memory erasure between awakenings ⓘ no additional awakening on Tuesday if the coin lands heads ⓘ |
| involvesConcept |
Bayesian updating
ⓘ
anthropic reasoning ⓘ centered worlds ⓘ conditionalization ⓘ de se belief ⓘ diachronic rationality ⓘ evidential selection effects ⓘ imprecise probabilities ⓘ indexical information ⓘ reflection principle ⓘ self-locating belief ⓘ self-locating evidence ⓘ |
| mainQuestion | What credence should Sleeping Beauty assign to the proposition that a fair coin landed heads upon awakening? ⓘ |
| notablePublication |
Adam Elga's 2000 paper "Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem"
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
David Lewis's 2001 paper "Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga" NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| relatedProblem |
Doomsday argument
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Monty Hall problem NERFINISHED ⓘ anthropic principle NERFINISHED ⓘ duplication thought experiments ⓘ reflection paradoxes ⓘ self-indication assumption ⓘ self-sampling assumption ⓘ |
| standardAnswer |
halfer position
ⓘ
thirder position ⓘ |
| thirderPositionClaim | Beauty's credence in heads upon awakening should be 1/3 ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.