C. L. Stevenson
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C. L. Stevenson was a 20th-century American philosopher best known for his influential work in metaethics and the development of emotivism, a noncognitivist theory of moral language.
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
20th-century philosopher
ⓘ
American philosopher ⓘ metaethicist ⓘ philosopher ⓘ |
| almaMater |
Cambridge University
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Yale University NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| associatedConcept | disagreement in belief vs. disagreement in attitude ⓘ |
| birthDate | 1908-06-27 ⓘ |
| birthPlace | Cincinnati, Ohio, United States NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| causeOfNotability | major figure in 20th-century metaethics ⓘ |
| citizenship |
United States of America
ⓘ
surface form:
United States
|
| conceptIntroduced | distinction between descriptive and emotive meaning ⓘ |
| deathDate | 1979-03-14 ⓘ |
| employer | University of Michigan NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| era | 20th-century philosophy ⓘ |
| familyName | Stevenson NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| fieldOfWork |
ethics
ⓘ
metaethics ⓘ philosophy ⓘ philosophy of language ⓘ |
| fullName | Charles Leslie Stevenson NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| gender | male ⓘ |
| givenName |
Charles
ⓘ
Leslie NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| influenced |
Allan Gibbard
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
R. M. Hare NERFINISHED ⓘ Simon Blackburn NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| influencedBy |
A. J. Ayer
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
David Hume NERFINISHED ⓘ logical positivism ⓘ |
| knownFor |
emotivism
ⓘ
noncognitivism in ethics ⓘ theory of moral language ⓘ |
| languageOfWork | English ⓘ |
| mainInterest |
disagreement in attitude
ⓘ
meaning of ethical terms ⓘ |
| movement | analytic philosophy ⓘ |
| nationality |
United States of America
ⓘ
surface form:
United States
|
| notableWork |
Ethics and Language
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Facts and Values NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| philosophicalStance |
noncognitivism about moral judgments
ⓘ
subjectivism about moral attitudes ⓘ |
| positionHeld | Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan ⓘ |
| publicationYearOfWork |
1944: Ethics and Language
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
1963: Facts and Values ⓘ |
| theoryCharacterization |
moral judgments express emotions rather than state facts
ⓘ
moral language has both emotive and persuasive meaning ⓘ |
| theoryDeveloped | emotivist theory of moral judgments ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.