open-question argument

E143657

The open-question argument is G. E. Moore’s influential philosophical critique of ethical naturalism, claiming that no proposed naturalistic definition of “good” can capture its meaning because it always remains an intelligible open question whether that definition is truly good.

All labels observed (2)

Label Occurrences
Natural Questions 1
open-question argument canonical 1

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Statements (48)

Predicate Object
instanceOf argument against ethical naturalism
metaethical argument
philosophical argument
associatedWith intuitionism
surface form: Moorean intuitionism

non-natural property of goodness
author G. E. Moore
conclusion good is not analytically equivalent to any natural property
no naturalistic definition of good is adequate
criticizedBy A. J. Ayer
C. L. Stevenson
Cornell realists
David Lewis
surface form: Frank Jackson

R. M. Hare
Richard Boyd
conceptual role semantics theorists
field analytic philosophy
ethics
metaethics
historicalPeriod early 20th century
implication ethical naturalism fails as a theory of moral meaning
good is a simple, indefinable property
moral properties are sui generis
influenced 20th-century analytic ethics
intuitionism in ethics
non-naturalist moral realism
keyClaim for any proposed naturalistic definition of good, it remains an open question whether that thing is good
meaning of good cannot be reduced to any natural property term
the question whether a proposed naturalistic property is good is not trivial or tautological
language English
mainWork Principia Ethica
method conceptual analysis of moral terms
opposesView good is identical to any single natural property
good is identical to pleasure
good is identical to what promotes survival
good is identical to what we desire to desire
premise if two terms are analytically equivalent, the question of their identity is trivial
questions about the goodness of any natural property are substantive, not trivial
publicationYear 1903
relatedConcept naturalistic fallacy
reliesOn distinction between analytic and synthetic truths
ordinary language intuitions about moral terms
supports moral non-naturalism
moral realism (non-naturalist)
targets ethical naturalism
naturalistic definitions of good
usedInDebate debates about the analytic-synthetic distinction in ethics
debates over moral naturalism vs non-naturalism
debates over moral reductionism

How these facts were elicited

Referenced by (2)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

G. E. Moore notableIdea open-question argument
Seneca the Younger notableWork open-question argument
this entity surface form: Natural Questions