International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system
E512045
The International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system is a global verification regime that uses inspections, monitoring, and accounting measures to ensure that states’ nuclear materials and activities are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other military purposes.
Observed surface forms (6)
Statements (50)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
non-proliferation mechanism
ⓘ
nuclear safeguards system ⓘ verification regime ⓘ |
| administeredBy | International Atomic Energy Agency NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| aimsAt |
confidence-building among states
ⓘ
nuclear non-proliferation ⓘ |
| alsoKnownAs |
IAEA safeguards
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
IAEA safeguards system NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| appliesTo |
nuclear facilities
ⓘ
nuclear material ⓘ nuclear-related activities ⓘ |
| contributesTo |
implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
ⓘ
international peace and security ⓘ |
| covers |
non-NPT states under item-specific agreements
ⓘ
non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT ⓘ nuclear-weapon states under voluntary offer agreements ⓘ |
| distinguishedFrom |
nuclear export control regimes
ⓘ
nuclear security measures ⓘ |
| evolvedFrom | early IAEA safeguards in the 1960s ⓘ |
| implementedBy | IAEA Department of Safeguards NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| implementedThrough | safeguards agreements between states and the IAEA ⓘ |
| legalBasis |
INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
INFCIRC/540 NERFINISHED ⓘ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NERFINISHED ⓘ additional protocols to safeguards agreements ⓘ comprehensive safeguards agreements ⓘ item-specific safeguards agreements ⓘ voluntary offer safeguards agreements ⓘ |
| monitors |
declared nuclear material inventories
ⓘ
flows of nuclear material ⓘ operation of safeguarded facilities ⓘ |
| partOf | international nuclear non-proliferation regime ⓘ |
| provides |
assurance about the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material
ⓘ
assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities where broader conclusion is drawn ⓘ safeguards conclusions to the IAEA Board of Governors ⓘ |
| purpose |
to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities
ⓘ
to provide assurance that declared nuclear material remains in peaceful activities ⓘ to verify that states do not divert nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ⓘ |
| reliesOn |
cooperation of states with IAEA inspectors
ⓘ
state declarations of nuclear material and activities ⓘ |
| requires | state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material ⓘ |
| strengthenedAfter | discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program in the early 1990s ⓘ |
| strengthenedBy | adoption of the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) ⓘ |
| usesMethod |
containment and surveillance
ⓘ
data analysis and evaluation ⓘ design information verification ⓘ environmental sampling ⓘ nuclear material accountancy ⓘ on-site inspections ⓘ remote monitoring ⓘ |
Referenced by (7)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone norms
→
monitoredBy
→
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system
ⓘ
this entity surface form:
Iran nuclear program verification
subject surface form:
Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
this entity surface form:
IAEA safeguards system
Treaty of Tlatelolco
→
verificationMechanism
→
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system
ⓘ
this entity surface form:
IAEA safeguards
this entity surface form:
Iran-IAEA safeguards agreement
this entity surface form:
International Atomic Energy Agency inspections
Fordow enrichment facility
→
underSafeguardsAgreement
→
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system
ⓘ
this entity surface form:
Iran–IAEA safeguards agreement