Sen’s liberal paradox
E494085
Sen’s liberal paradox is a result in social choice theory showing that even minimal individual rights can be incompatible with always achieving Pareto-efficient collective decisions.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Sen’s liberal paradox canonical | 1 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T5114209 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
Target entity: Sen’s liberal paradox Context triple: [Arrow’s impossibility theorem, relatedTo, Sen’s liberal paradox]
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A.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory showing that no voting system can convert individual preferences into a collective ranking while simultaneously satisfying a set of seemingly reasonable fairness criteria.
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B.
Arrow paradox
The Arrow paradox is an ancient philosophical argument that challenges the coherence of motion by claiming that a flying arrow must be motionless at every instant of its flight.
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C.
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Collective Choice and Social Welfare is a foundational work in social choice theory that rigorously examines how individual preferences can be aggregated into collective decisions while addressing issues of welfare, justice, and fairness.
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D.
Condorcet paradox
The Condorcet paradox is a voting theory phenomenon where collective preferences can become cyclic and inconsistent, even when individual voters’ preferences are perfectly rational and transitive.
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E.
Paradoxes of plurality
Paradoxes of plurality are a set of arguments by Zeno of Elea that challenge the coherence of the concepts of plurality and divisibility in space and time.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
Target entity: Sen’s liberal paradox Target entity description: Sen’s liberal paradox is a result in social choice theory showing that even minimal individual rights can be incompatible with always achieving Pareto-efficient collective decisions.
-
A.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory showing that no voting system can convert individual preferences into a collective ranking while simultaneously satisfying a set of seemingly reasonable fairness criteria.
-
B.
Arrow paradox
The Arrow paradox is an ancient philosophical argument that challenges the coherence of motion by claiming that a flying arrow must be motionless at every instant of its flight.
-
C.
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Collective Choice and Social Welfare is a foundational work in social choice theory that rigorously examines how individual preferences can be aggregated into collective decisions while addressing issues of welfare, justice, and fairness.
-
D.
Condorcet paradox
The Condorcet paradox is a voting theory phenomenon where collective preferences can become cyclic and inconsistent, even when individual voters’ preferences are perfectly rational and transitive.
-
E.
Paradoxes of plurality
Paradoxes of plurality are a set of arguments by Zeno of Elea that challenge the coherence of the concepts of plurality and divisibility in space and time.
- F. None of above. chosen
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
impossibility result
ⓘ
paradox in welfare economics ⓘ result in social choice theory ⓘ |
| assumption |
Pareto principle is applied to social states
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
at least three social states are available ⓘ at least two individuals exist in the society ⓘ individual rights are modeled as decisive power over certain personal choices ⓘ individuals have preferences over social states ⓘ preferences are complete and transitive ⓘ social choice rule aggregates individual preferences into a social ordering ⓘ social preference relation is complete and transitive ⓘ |
| author | Amartya Sen NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| category |
economic paradox
ⓘ
impossibility theorem in social choice ⓘ philosophical paradox ⓘ |
| contrastsWith | utilitarian approaches that ignore individual rights as constraints ⓘ |
| coreClaim |
even minimal individual rights can conflict with Pareto efficiency
ⓘ
no social decision rule can simultaneously satisfy minimal liberalism and unrestricted Pareto efficiency under its assumptions ⓘ |
| field |
political philosophy
ⓘ
social choice theory ⓘ welfare economics ⓘ |
| formalizes |
conflict between personal liberty and social welfare maximization
ⓘ
tension between individual rights and collective rationality ⓘ |
| hasImplication |
complete respect for individual liberties may be incompatible with standard welfare criteria
ⓘ
design of constitutions and decision procedures must trade off rights and efficiency ⓘ |
| illustratedBy | examples where individuals have decisive control over personal choices that affect others ⓘ |
| incompatibilityBetween |
Pareto efficiency
ⓘ
minimal liberalism ⓘ |
| influenced |
debates on liberalism and paternalism
ⓘ
subsequent work on social choice with rights ⓘ theory of rights in economics ⓘ |
| motivated |
research on alternative formulations of rights and liberties
ⓘ
research on domain restrictions to avoid the paradox ⓘ |
| namedAfter | Amartya Sen NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| publishedIn | The Review of Economic Studies NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| relatedConcept |
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Pareto efficiency NERFINISHED ⓘ collective choice ⓘ minimal liberalism ⓘ rights-based liberalism ⓘ social welfare function ⓘ |
| showsThat |
granting individuals decisive control over some choices can force socially Pareto-inferior outcomes
ⓘ
no social decision rule can fully respect both minimal liberty and Pareto efficiency under its framework ⓘ respecting minimal individual rights may require violating Pareto principle ⓘ |
| typicalExampleFeatures |
Pareto-superior outcome that violates someone’s right
ⓘ
at least one private decision for which each individual has decisive authority ⓘ two individuals with preferences over each other’s actions ⓘ |
| yearProposed | 1970 ⓘ |
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Subject: Sen’s liberal paradox Description of subject: Sen’s liberal paradox is a result in social choice theory showing that even minimal individual rights can be incompatible with always achieving Pareto-efficient collective decisions.
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.