Sen’s liberal paradox
E494085
Sen’s liberal paradox is a result in social choice theory showing that even minimal individual rights can be incompatible with always achieving Pareto-efficient collective decisions.
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
impossibility result
ⓘ
paradox in welfare economics ⓘ result in social choice theory ⓘ |
| assumption |
Pareto principle is applied to social states
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
at least three social states are available ⓘ at least two individuals exist in the society ⓘ individual rights are modeled as decisive power over certain personal choices ⓘ individuals have preferences over social states ⓘ preferences are complete and transitive ⓘ social choice rule aggregates individual preferences into a social ordering ⓘ social preference relation is complete and transitive ⓘ |
| author | Amartya Sen NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| category |
economic paradox
ⓘ
impossibility theorem in social choice ⓘ philosophical paradox ⓘ |
| contrastsWith | utilitarian approaches that ignore individual rights as constraints ⓘ |
| coreClaim |
even minimal individual rights can conflict with Pareto efficiency
ⓘ
no social decision rule can simultaneously satisfy minimal liberalism and unrestricted Pareto efficiency under its assumptions ⓘ |
| field |
political philosophy
ⓘ
social choice theory ⓘ welfare economics ⓘ |
| formalizes |
conflict between personal liberty and social welfare maximization
ⓘ
tension between individual rights and collective rationality ⓘ |
| hasImplication |
complete respect for individual liberties may be incompatible with standard welfare criteria
ⓘ
design of constitutions and decision procedures must trade off rights and efficiency ⓘ |
| illustratedBy | examples where individuals have decisive control over personal choices that affect others ⓘ |
| incompatibilityBetween |
Pareto efficiency
ⓘ
minimal liberalism ⓘ |
| influenced |
debates on liberalism and paternalism
ⓘ
subsequent work on social choice with rights ⓘ theory of rights in economics ⓘ |
| motivated |
research on alternative formulations of rights and liberties
ⓘ
research on domain restrictions to avoid the paradox ⓘ |
| namedAfter | Amartya Sen NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| publishedIn | The Review of Economic Studies NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| relatedConcept |
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Pareto efficiency NERFINISHED ⓘ collective choice ⓘ minimal liberalism ⓘ rights-based liberalism ⓘ social welfare function ⓘ |
| showsThat |
granting individuals decisive control over some choices can force socially Pareto-inferior outcomes
ⓘ
no social decision rule can fully respect both minimal liberty and Pareto efficiency under its framework ⓘ respecting minimal individual rights may require violating Pareto principle ⓘ |
| typicalExampleFeatures |
Pareto-superior outcome that violates someone’s right
ⓘ
at least one private decision for which each individual has decisive authority ⓘ two individuals with preferences over each other’s actions ⓘ |
| yearProposed | 1970 ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.