Stag Hunt
E478795
Stag Hunt is a classic game-theoretic scenario illustrating the tension between mutual cooperation for a high payoff and individual risk-averse choices that yield lower but safer rewards.
Statements (46)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
2×2 game
ⓘ
coordination game ⓘ game-theoretic scenario ⓘ strategic-form game ⓘ symmetric game ⓘ |
| differsFrom | Prisoner’s Dilemma by making cooperation a Nash equilibrium ⓘ |
| hasAlternativeName | assurance game NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| hasCanonicalPayoffOrdering | R > T ≥ P > S ⓘ |
| hasFeature |
higher payoff from mutual cooperation than from mutual defection
ⓘ
multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria ⓘ preference for coordination over miscoordination ⓘ strategic complementarity ⓘ strategic risk in choosing cooperative action ⓘ |
| hasHighPayoffOutcome | both players hunt stag ⓘ |
| hasInterpretation |
collective action problems
ⓘ
security and assurance in cooperation ⓘ social contract formation ⓘ technology adoption coordination ⓘ |
| hasKeyConcept |
assurance about others’ actions
ⓘ
coordination failure ⓘ equilibrium selection ⓘ payoff-dominance ⓘ risk-dominance ⓘ |
| hasNashEquilibrium |
(hare, hare)
ⓘ
(stag, stag) ⓘ |
| hasOrigin | metaphor of hunters choosing between stag and hare ⓘ |
| hasPayoffProperty |
payoff-dominant equilibrium at (stag, stag)
ⓘ
risk-dominant equilibrium at (hare, hare) ⓘ |
| hasPlayerCount | 2 ⓘ |
| hasRiskyStrategy | hunt stag ⓘ |
| hasSafeOutcome | both players hunt hare ⓘ |
| hasSafeStrategy | hunt hare ⓘ |
| hasStrategy |
hunt hare
ⓘ
hunt stag ⓘ |
| illustrates |
tension between cooperation and risk
ⓘ
trade-off between safety and social efficiency ⓘ |
| isContrastedWith | Prisoner’s Dilemma NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| isUsedIn |
coordination problem analysis
ⓘ
evolutionary game theory ⓘ experimental economics ⓘ multi-agent systems research ⓘ political philosophy ⓘ social contract theory ⓘ |
| models |
coordination problems with payoff-dominant and risk-dominant equilibria
ⓘ
situations requiring mutual cooperation for high payoff ⓘ |
| requiresForHighPayoff | mutual cooperation ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.