Thomas Schelling

E420084

Thomas Schelling was an American economist and game theorist renowned for his work on conflict, cooperation, and nuclear strategy, for which he received the Nobel Prize in Economics.

All labels observed (3)

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Statements (50)

Predicate Object
instanceOf Nobel laureate in Economics
economist
game theorist
human
university teacher
academicDegree PhD in economics
awardReceived Frank E. Seidman Distinguished Award in Political Economy
National Academy of Sciences
surface form: National Academy of Sciences membership

National Medal of Science
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
countryOfCitizenship United States of America
dateOfBirth 1921-04-14
dateOfDeath 2016-12-13
educatedAt Harvard University
University of California, Berkeley
employer Harvard University
Harvard Kennedy School
surface form: John F. Kennedy School of Government

RAND Corporation
University of Maryland
surface form: University of Maryland, College Park

Yale University
familyName Schelling
fieldOfWork conflict resolution
economics
game theory
international relations
nuclear strategy
strategic studies
fullName Thomas Schelling self-linksurface differs
surface form: Thomas Crombie Schelling
givenName Thomas
knownFor Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process
surface form: Schelling segregation model

analysis of conflict and cooperation using game theory
development of focal point concept in coordination games
work on nuclear deterrence and arms control
language English
NobelPrizeField Economic Sciences
NobelPrizeMotivation for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis
NobelPrizeYear 2005
notableWork Arms and Influence
Choice and Consequence
Micromotives and Macrobehavior
Strategy and Arms Control
The Strategy of Conflict
placeOfBirth Oakland, California, United States
placeOfDeath Bethesda, Maryland, United States NERFINISHED
positionHeld Professor of Economics
Professor of Foreign Policy, National Security, and Nuclear Strategy
researchInterest bargaining theory
deterrence theory
focal points in game theory
segregation dynamics

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Referenced by (3)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Schelling hasNotableBearer Thomas Schelling
“Classics in Game Theory” (editor) hasContributor Thomas Schelling
subject surface form: Classics in Game Theory
this entity surface form: Thomas C. Schelling
Thomas Schelling fullName Thomas Schelling self-linksurface differs
this entity surface form: Thomas Crombie Schelling