counterpart theory of trans-world identity
E392413
modal metaphysical theory
philosophical theory
theory in analytic metaphysics
theory of identity across possible worlds
theory of modality
The counterpart theory of trans-world identity is David Lewis’s influential modal metaphysical view that individuals in different possible worlds are not literally the same entity but related by similarity-based “counterpart” relations.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| counterpart theory of trans-world identity canonical | 1 |
Statements (47)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
modal metaphysical theory
ⓘ
philosophical theory ⓘ theory in analytic metaphysics ⓘ theory of identity across possible worlds ⓘ theory of modality ⓘ |
| addresses |
metaphysics of possible individuals
ⓘ
problems of trans-world identity ⓘ semantics of modal discourse ⓘ |
| analyzes |
claims about what particular individuals could have been like
ⓘ
de re modality ⓘ |
| appliesTo |
concrete particulars
ⓘ
individual objects ⓘ persons ⓘ |
| asserts | individuals in different possible worlds are distinct but related by counterpart relations ⓘ |
| associatedWith | David Lewis ⓘ |
| compatibleWith |
David Lewis's modal realism
ⓘ
surface form:
Lewisian modal realism
|
| contrastsWith |
Kripkean essentialism about individuals
ⓘ
haecceitism ⓘ trans-world identity theory ⓘ |
| coreClaim |
an individual in one world is represented in another world by a counterpart rather than by being literally the same entity
ⓘ
counterpart relations are grounded in qualitative similarity and contextually salient respects ⓘ modal statements about what an individual could have been are analyzed via properties of its counterparts in other worlds ⓘ |
| criticizedFor |
alleged failure to capture intuitive de re modal claims
ⓘ
context-sensitivity of counterpart relations ⓘ counterintuitive treatment of trans-world identity ⓘ |
| defendedBy | David Lewis ⓘ |
| denies | strict trans-world identity of individuals ⓘ |
| developedIn | 20th century ⓘ |
| hasComponent |
analysis of modal predication
ⓘ
similarity-based counterpart relation ⓘ world-indexed individuals ⓘ |
| implies |
identity is world-bound
ⓘ
modal discourse is made true by facts about counterparts in other worlds ⓘ no individual exists in more than one possible world ⓘ |
| influencedBy |
David Lewis's modal realism
ⓘ
surface form:
David Lewis’s modal realism
|
| mainProponent | David Lewis ⓘ |
| philosophicalTradition | analytic philosophy ⓘ |
| relatedField |
metaphysics
ⓘ
modal logic ⓘ philosophy of language ⓘ philosophy of logic ⓘ |
| relatedWork | On the Plurality of Worlds ⓘ |
| relatedWorkAuthor | David Lewis ⓘ |
| usesConcept |
counterpart relation
ⓘ
modal realism ⓘ possible world ⓘ similarity-based relation ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.