David Lewis's modal realism

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David Lewis's modal realism is a philosophical theory claiming that all logically possible worlds are just as real and concrete as the actual world, differing only in which one we inhabit.

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All labels observed (3)

Label	Occurrences
David Lewis’s modal realism	2
David Lewis's modal realism canonical	1
Lewisian modal realism	1

Referenced by (4)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

counterpart theory → influencedBy → David Lewis's modal realism ⓘ

Parts of Classes → associatedWith → David Lewis's modal realism ⓘ

this entity surface form: David Lewis’s modal realism

counterpart theory of trans-world identity → compatibleWith → David Lewis's modal realism ⓘ

this entity surface form: Lewisian modal realism

counterpart theory of trans-world identity → influencedBy → David Lewis's modal realism ⓘ

this entity surface form: David Lewis’s modal realism