Elliptic Curve Cryptography
E37202
Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a public-key cryptographic approach that uses the mathematics of elliptic curves over finite fields to provide strong security with relatively small key sizes.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Elliptic Curve Cryptography canonical | 3 |
Statements (49)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
asymmetric cryptography
ⓘ
public-key cryptography scheme ⓘ |
| abbreviation | ECC ⓘ |
| advantageOverRSA |
lower bandwidth requirements
ⓘ
lower computational cost on constrained devices ⓘ smaller key sizes for comparable security ⓘ |
| applicationDomain |
embedded systems security
ⓘ
internet security ⓘ |
| basedOn | elliptic curves ⓘ |
| comparedTo | RSA ⓘ |
| designGoal | high security per bit of key length ⓘ |
| hasVariant |
Curve25519-based schemes
ⓘ
Ed25519 signatures ⓘ Koblitz curves ⓘ brainpool curves ⓘ |
| includesScheme |
ECMQV
ⓘ
Diffie–Hellman key exchange ⓘ
surface form:
Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ⓘ |
| introducedBy |
Neal Koblitz
ⓘ
Neal Koblitz ⓘ
surface form:
Victor S. Miller
|
| keyAdvantage | strong security with relatively small key sizes ⓘ |
| notVulnerableTo | classical sub-exponential algorithms known for integer factorization ⓘ |
| provides |
digital signatures
ⓘ
key agreement ⓘ public-key encryption ⓘ |
| requires |
careful curve selection
ⓘ
secure parameter generation ⓘ |
| securityBasedOn | elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem ⓘ |
| standardizedBy |
ANSI
ⓘ
IEEE Standards Association ⓘ
surface form:
IEEE
National Institute of Standards and Technology ⓘ
surface form:
NIST
SECG ⓘ |
| threatenedBy | quantum computers running Shor's algorithm ⓘ |
| typicalField |
binary fields
ⓘ
extension fields ⓘ prime fields ⓘ |
| usedIn |
HTTPS
ⓘ
PGP ⓘ SSH ⓘ TLS ⓘ blockchain systems ⓘ cryptocurrencies ⓘ mobile device security ⓘ smart cards ⓘ |
| uses |
elliptic curves over finite fields
ⓘ
group law on elliptic curves ⓘ |
| vulnerableTo |
poorly chosen curves
ⓘ
side-channel attacks if not implemented correctly ⓘ |
| yearProposed | 1985 ⓘ |
Referenced by (3)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.