Book 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature

E103022

Book 3 of *A Treatise of Human Nature* is the section of David Hume’s philosophical work that develops his influential account of morality, including the role of sentiment, virtue, and justice.

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Predicate Object
instanceOf part of philosophical treatise
philosophical book section
author David Hume
claims moral approval and disapproval are species of pleasure and uneasiness
moral distinctions are derived from moral sentiments
moral properties are not discovered by reason alone
there is an is–ought gap between descriptive and normative statements
vice is whatever mental quality is disapproved by a spectator employing a general point of view
virtue is whatever mental quality is approved by a spectator employing a general point of view
discusses artificial virtues
benevolence
natural virtues
self-love
sympathy
the sensible knave
ethicalView anti-rationalism about morals
moral sentimentalism
naturalistic account of morality
famousFor account of justice as an artificial virtue
account of promises as artificial obligations
development of Humean sentimentalist ethics
discussion of the origin of government and political allegiance
formulation of the is–ought problem
hasPart Part 1 Of virtue and vice in general
Part 2 Of justice and injustice
Part 3 Of the other virtues and vices
historicalContext written in the 1730s
influenced debates about moral motivation and internalism
later sentimentalist moral philosophers
metaethics in analytic philosophy
language English
mainTopic ethics
justice
moral judgment
moral motivation
moral philosophy
morality
sentiment
virtue
partOf Book 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature self-linksurface differs
surface form: A Treatise of Human Nature
philosophicalTradition British empiricism
early modern philosophy
positionOnJustice explains rules of property as products of social convention and utility
treats justice as an artificial virtue arising from conventions
positionOnMoralLanguage denies that moral terms represent objective properties independent of sentiment
positionOnPromises argues that the obligation of promises is artificial and conventional
positionOnReasonAndPassion claims that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions
denies that reason alone can be a motive to the will
publicationDate 1739–1740
structure divided into three parts

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Referenced by (2)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals basedOn Book 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature
Book 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature partOf Book 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature self-linksurface differs
this entity surface form: A Treatise of Human Nature