Triple
T7651538
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | Bengt Holmström |
E173262
|
entity |
| Predicate | notableWork |
P4
|
FINISHED |
| Object |
Moral Hazard and Observability
"Moral Hazard and Observability" is a seminal economic paper by Bengt Holmström that develops the theory of optimal incentive contracts under conditions of hidden actions and imperfect information.
|
E680268
|
NE FINISHED |
Provenance (5 batches)
| Stage | Batch ID | Job type | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| creating | batch_69c6995473348190a4f41d110d619a18 |
elicitation | completed |
| NER | batch_69c701770ac881909452348c9547ab47 |
ner | completed |
| NED1 | batch_69c89aeb66c081909f3a3d6385637c25 |
ned_source_triple | completed |
| NED2 | batch_69c89f35a7488190a6a9bc3d10bedd5a |
ned_description | completed |
| NEDg | batch_69c89ed393648190a32cf9267968faf5 |
nedg | completed |
Created at: March 27, 2026, 3:58 p.m.