Triple
T21191801
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | RFC 6147 |
E522228
|
entity |
| Predicate | relatedTo |
P37
|
FINISHED |
| Object | DNSSEC |
—
|
NE NERFINISHED |
How this triple was built (2 steps)
Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.
NER
Named-entity recognition
gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: DNSSEC | Statement: [RFC 6147, relatedTo, DNSSEC]
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: DNSSEC Context triple: [RFC 6147, relatedTo, DNSSEC]
-
A.
DNSSEC
chosen
DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) is a suite of specifications that adds cryptographic authentication and integrity protection to DNS data to prevent attacks such as cache poisoning and spoofing.
-
B.
DNSSEC ZSK
DNSSEC ZSK (Zone Signing Key) is the cryptographic key used in DNS Security Extensions to sign individual DNS zone data, ensuring the authenticity and integrity of DNS responses.
-
C.
DNSKEY
DNSKEY is a DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) resource record that stores public keys used to verify digital signatures and authenticate DNS data.
-
D.
DNSSEC KSK
The DNSSEC KSK (Key Signing Key) is a long-term cryptographic key used to sign and authenticate a zone’s DNSKEY records, forming the trust anchor at the top of the DNSSEC validation chain.
-
E.
DNSSEC root key signing ceremony
The DNSSEC root key signing ceremony is a highly controlled, regularly scheduled cryptographic event where trusted personnel generate and manage the root cryptographic keys that secure the global Domain Name System.
- F. None of above.
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
Provenance (2 batches)
The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.
| Step | Stage | Batch ID | Status | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| creating | Elicitation | batch_69e0b51061388190aa03f19700d3ef04 |
completed | April 16, 2026, 10:08 a.m. |
| NER | Named-entity recognition | batch_69e733381f288190b3da795f62a39568 |
completed | April 21, 2026, 8:20 a.m. |
Created at: April 16, 2026, 3:07 p.m.