Triple
T18553289
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | SAE handshake |
E453436
|
entity |
| Predicate | instanceOf |
P0
|
FINISHED |
| Object | authenticated key exchange protocol |
C994
|
CONCEPT FINISHED |
How this triple was built (1 step)
Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.
CD
Concept disambiguation
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target class: authenticated key exchange protocol Context triple: [SAE handshake, instanceOf, authenticated key exchange protocol]
-
A.
cryptographic protocol
chosen
A cryptographic protocol is a precisely defined sequence of operations and message exchanges that uses cryptographic primitives to achieve security goals such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation between parties.
-
B.
cryptographic protocol framework
A cryptographic protocol framework is a structured set of tools, abstractions, and rules that enables the design, specification, analysis, and implementation of secure communication protocols.
-
C.
IPsec key exchange phase
IPsec key exchange phase is the process in which two network entities securely negotiate and establish shared cryptographic keys and security parameters used to protect subsequent IPsec communications.
-
D.
cryptographic protocol message
A cryptographic protocol message is a structured unit of data exchanged between parties in a cryptographic protocol, containing information such as identifiers, nonces, keys, and signatures to achieve security goals like confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.
-
E.
asymmetric cryptographic algorithm
An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm is a method that uses a mathematically related pair of keys—one public and one private—to enable secure operations such as encryption, decryption, and digital signatures without sharing secret keys.
- F. None of above.
Provenance (1 batch)
The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.
| Step | Stage | Batch ID | Status | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| creating | Elicitation | batch_69d8d388b0c881908e610a1c45b52640 |
completed | April 10, 2026, 10:40 a.m. |
Created at: April 10, 2026, 11:38 a.m.