Triple
T18158114
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem |
E434684
|
entity |
| Predicate | hasVariant |
P455
|
FINISHED |
| Object | general knapsack cryptosystem |
—
|
NE NERFINISHED |
How this triple was built (3 steps)
Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.
NER
Named-entity recognition
gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: general knapsack cryptosystem | Statement: [Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem, hasVariant, general knapsack cryptosystem]
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: general knapsack cryptosystem Context triple: [Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem, hasVariant, general knapsack cryptosystem]
-
A.
Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem
The Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem is an early public-key encryption scheme based on the subset sum (knapsack) problem, historically significant as one of the first practical public-key systems though later found to be insecure.
-
B.
Rabin cryptosystem
The Rabin cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme based on the hardness of integer factorization, notable for its provable security equivalence to factoring and its similarity to RSA.
-
C.
Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem
The Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme designed to be secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, improving on earlier systems like ElGamal in terms of robustness and security guarantees.
-
D.
ElGamal
ElGamal is a public-key cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm problem, widely used for secure encryption and digital signatures in various cryptographic protocols.
-
E.
Merkle puzzles
Merkle puzzles are an early cryptographic protocol that introduced the concept of public-key exchange by allowing two parties to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel using computationally asymmetric “puzzle” problems.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NED2
Entity disambiguation (via description)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: general knapsack cryptosystem Target entity description: The general knapsack cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme based on the computational hardness of the general subset sum (knapsack) problem, without relying on special structured sequences like superincreasing ones.
-
A.
Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem
The Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem is an early public-key encryption scheme based on the subset sum (knapsack) problem, historically significant as one of the first practical public-key systems though later found to be insecure.
-
B.
Rabin cryptosystem
The Rabin cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme based on the hardness of integer factorization, notable for its provable security equivalence to factoring and its similarity to RSA.
-
C.
Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem
The Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme designed to be secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, improving on earlier systems like ElGamal in terms of robustness and security guarantees.
-
D.
ElGamal
ElGamal is a public-key cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm problem, widely used for secure encryption and digital signatures in various cryptographic protocols.
-
E.
Merkle puzzles
Merkle puzzles are an early cryptographic protocol that introduced the concept of public-key exchange by allowing two parties to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel using computationally asymmetric “puzzle” problems.
- F. None of above. chosen
Provenance (2 batches)
The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.
| Step | Stage | Batch ID | Status | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| creating | Elicitation | batch_69d8b90b7a188190b3fc7b8d4a6cd20a |
completed | April 10, 2026, 8:47 a.m. |
| NER | Named-entity recognition | batch_69e4dec02d9c81909ac6203b7d59c405 |
completed | April 19, 2026, 1:55 p.m. |
Created at: April 10, 2026, 10:30 a.m.