Triple

T18158114
Position Surface form Disambiguated ID Type / Status
Subject Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem E434684 entity
Predicate hasVariant P455 FINISHED
Object general knapsack cryptosystem NE NERFINISHED

How this triple was built (3 steps)

Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.

NER Named-entity recognition gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: general knapsack cryptosystem | Statement: [Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem, hasVariant, general knapsack cryptosystem]
NED1 Entity disambiguation (via context triple) gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: general knapsack cryptosystem
Context triple: [Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem, hasVariant, general knapsack cryptosystem]
  • A. Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem
    The Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem is an early public-key encryption scheme based on the subset sum (knapsack) problem, historically significant as one of the first practical public-key systems though later found to be insecure.
  • B. Rabin cryptosystem
    The Rabin cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme based on the hardness of integer factorization, notable for its provable security equivalence to factoring and its similarity to RSA.
  • C. Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem
    The Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme designed to be secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, improving on earlier systems like ElGamal in terms of robustness and security guarantees.
  • D. ElGamal
    ElGamal is a public-key cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm problem, widely used for secure encryption and digital signatures in various cryptographic protocols.
  • E. Merkle puzzles
    Merkle puzzles are an early cryptographic protocol that introduced the concept of public-key exchange by allowing two parties to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel using computationally asymmetric “puzzle” problems.
  • F. None of above. chosen
  • G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NED2 Entity disambiguation (via description) gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: general knapsack cryptosystem
Target entity description: The general knapsack cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme based on the computational hardness of the general subset sum (knapsack) problem, without relying on special structured sequences like superincreasing ones.
  • A. Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem
    The Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem is an early public-key encryption scheme based on the subset sum (knapsack) problem, historically significant as one of the first practical public-key systems though later found to be insecure.
  • B. Rabin cryptosystem
    The Rabin cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme based on the hardness of integer factorization, notable for its provable security equivalence to factoring and its similarity to RSA.
  • C. Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem
    The Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem is a public-key encryption scheme designed to be secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, improving on earlier systems like ElGamal in terms of robustness and security guarantees.
  • D. ElGamal
    ElGamal is a public-key cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm problem, widely used for secure encryption and digital signatures in various cryptographic protocols.
  • E. Merkle puzzles
    Merkle puzzles are an early cryptographic protocol that introduced the concept of public-key exchange by allowing two parties to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel using computationally asymmetric “puzzle” problems.
  • F. None of above. chosen

Provenance (2 batches)

The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.

Step Stage Batch ID Status When
creating Elicitation batch_69d8b90b7a188190b3fc7b8d4a6cd20a completed April 10, 2026, 8:47 a.m.
NER Named-entity recognition batch_69e4dec02d9c81909ac6203b7d59c405 completed April 19, 2026, 1:55 p.m.
Created at: April 10, 2026, 10:30 a.m.