Triple

T18158100
Position Surface form Disambiguated ID Type / Status
Subject Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem E434684 entity
Predicate vulnerableTo P583 FINISHED
Object Shamir’s attack NE NERFINISHED

How this triple was built (3 steps)

Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.

NER Named-entity recognition gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: Shamir’s attack | Statement: [Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem, vulnerableTo, Shamir’s attack]
NED1 Entity disambiguation (via context triple) gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Shamir’s attack
Context triple: [Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem, vulnerableTo, Shamir’s attack]
  • A. Shamir secret sharing scheme
    The Shamir secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic method that divides a secret into multiple parts so that only a specified threshold of parts can reconstruct the original secret, while fewer parts reveal nothing.
  • B. Blakley secret sharing scheme
    The Blakley secret sharing scheme is a threshold cryptographic method that hides a secret as the intersection point of multiple hyperplanes, requiring a minimum number of shares (hyperplanes) to reconstruct it.
  • C. Shamir’s attack on RSA with low decryption exponent
    Shamir’s attack on RSA with low decryption exponent is a cryptanalytic method that exploits unusually small private exponents in RSA to efficiently recover the secret key and break the encryption.
  • D. Wiener’s attack on RSA
    Wiener’s attack on RSA is a cryptanalytic method that efficiently recovers the private key when the RSA decryption exponent is unusually small, exploiting properties of continued fractions.
  • E. Merkle puzzles
    Merkle puzzles are an early cryptographic protocol that introduced the concept of public-key exchange by allowing two parties to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel using computationally asymmetric “puzzle” problems.
  • F. None of above. chosen
  • G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NED2 Entity disambiguation (via description) gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Shamir’s attack
Target entity description: Shamir’s attack is a cryptanalytic method devised by Adi Shamir that efficiently breaks the original Merkle–Hellman knapsack public-key cryptosystem by reconstructing its hidden superincreasing sequence.
  • A. Shamir secret sharing scheme
    The Shamir secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic method that divides a secret into multiple parts so that only a specified threshold of parts can reconstruct the original secret, while fewer parts reveal nothing.
  • B. Blakley secret sharing scheme
    The Blakley secret sharing scheme is a threshold cryptographic method that hides a secret as the intersection point of multiple hyperplanes, requiring a minimum number of shares (hyperplanes) to reconstruct it.
  • C. Shamir’s attack on RSA with low decryption exponent
    Shamir’s attack on RSA with low decryption exponent is a cryptanalytic method that exploits unusually small private exponents in RSA to efficiently recover the secret key and break the encryption.
  • D. Wiener’s attack on RSA
    Wiener’s attack on RSA is a cryptanalytic method that efficiently recovers the private key when the RSA decryption exponent is unusually small, exploiting properties of continued fractions.
  • E. Merkle puzzles
    Merkle puzzles are an early cryptographic protocol that introduced the concept of public-key exchange by allowing two parties to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel using computationally asymmetric “puzzle” problems.
  • F. None of above. chosen

Provenance (2 batches)

The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.

Step Stage Batch ID Status When
creating Elicitation batch_69d8b90b7a188190b3fc7b8d4a6cd20a completed April 10, 2026, 8:47 a.m.
NER Named-entity recognition batch_69e4dec02d9c81909ac6203b7d59c405 completed April 19, 2026, 1:55 p.m.
Created at: April 10, 2026, 10:30 a.m.