Triple
T18158100
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem |
E434684
|
entity |
| Predicate | vulnerableTo |
P583
|
FINISHED |
| Object | Shamir’s attack |
—
|
NE NERFINISHED |
How this triple was built (3 steps)
Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.
NER
Named-entity recognition
gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: Shamir’s attack | Statement: [Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem, vulnerableTo, Shamir’s attack]
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Shamir’s attack Context triple: [Merkle–Hellman knapsack cryptosystem, vulnerableTo, Shamir’s attack]
-
A.
Shamir secret sharing scheme
The Shamir secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic method that divides a secret into multiple parts so that only a specified threshold of parts can reconstruct the original secret, while fewer parts reveal nothing.
-
B.
Blakley secret sharing scheme
The Blakley secret sharing scheme is a threshold cryptographic method that hides a secret as the intersection point of multiple hyperplanes, requiring a minimum number of shares (hyperplanes) to reconstruct it.
-
C.
Shamir’s attack on RSA with low decryption exponent
Shamir’s attack on RSA with low decryption exponent is a cryptanalytic method that exploits unusually small private exponents in RSA to efficiently recover the secret key and break the encryption.
-
D.
Wiener’s attack on RSA
Wiener’s attack on RSA is a cryptanalytic method that efficiently recovers the private key when the RSA decryption exponent is unusually small, exploiting properties of continued fractions.
-
E.
Merkle puzzles
Merkle puzzles are an early cryptographic protocol that introduced the concept of public-key exchange by allowing two parties to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel using computationally asymmetric “puzzle” problems.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NED2
Entity disambiguation (via description)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Shamir’s attack Target entity description: Shamir’s attack is a cryptanalytic method devised by Adi Shamir that efficiently breaks the original Merkle–Hellman knapsack public-key cryptosystem by reconstructing its hidden superincreasing sequence.
-
A.
Shamir secret sharing scheme
The Shamir secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic method that divides a secret into multiple parts so that only a specified threshold of parts can reconstruct the original secret, while fewer parts reveal nothing.
-
B.
Blakley secret sharing scheme
The Blakley secret sharing scheme is a threshold cryptographic method that hides a secret as the intersection point of multiple hyperplanes, requiring a minimum number of shares (hyperplanes) to reconstruct it.
-
C.
Shamir’s attack on RSA with low decryption exponent
Shamir’s attack on RSA with low decryption exponent is a cryptanalytic method that exploits unusually small private exponents in RSA to efficiently recover the secret key and break the encryption.
-
D.
Wiener’s attack on RSA
Wiener’s attack on RSA is a cryptanalytic method that efficiently recovers the private key when the RSA decryption exponent is unusually small, exploiting properties of continued fractions.
-
E.
Merkle puzzles
Merkle puzzles are an early cryptographic protocol that introduced the concept of public-key exchange by allowing two parties to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel using computationally asymmetric “puzzle” problems.
- F. None of above. chosen
Provenance (2 batches)
The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.
| Step | Stage | Batch ID | Status | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| creating | Elicitation | batch_69d8b90b7a188190b3fc7b8d4a6cd20a |
completed | April 10, 2026, 8:47 a.m. |
| NER | Named-entity recognition | batch_69e4dec02d9c81909ac6203b7d59c405 |
completed | April 19, 2026, 1:55 p.m. |
Created at: April 10, 2026, 10:30 a.m.