Triple
T1712065
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | DNSSEC root key signing ceremony |
E37204
|
entity |
| Predicate | relatedTo |
P37
|
FINISHED |
| Object | Domain Name System Security Extensions |
E37203
|
NE FINISHED |
How this triple was built (2 steps)
Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.
NER
Named-entity recognition
gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: Domain Name System Security Extensions | Statement: [DNSSEC root key signing ceremony, relatedTo, Domain Name System Security Extensions]
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Domain Name System Security Extensions Context triple: [DNSSEC root key signing ceremony, relatedTo, Domain Name System Security Extensions]
-
A.
DNSSEC
chosen
DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) is a suite of specifications that adds cryptographic authentication and integrity protection to DNS data to prevent attacks such as cache poisoning and spoofing.
-
B.
DNSSEC root key signing ceremony
The DNSSEC root key signing ceremony is a highly controlled, regularly scheduled cryptographic event where trusted personnel generate and manage the root cryptographic keys that secure the global Domain Name System.
-
C.
Domain Name System root zone
The Domain Name System root zone is the top-level, authoritative directory of the internet’s domain name hierarchy, mapping top-level domains to their corresponding name servers.
-
D.
Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
"Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)" is an IETF standard (RFC 7919) that defines secure, standardized finite-field Diffie-Hellman parameter sets for use in TLS to improve cryptographic security and interoperability.
-
E.
Diffie–Hellman key exchange
Diffie–Hellman key exchange is a foundational cryptographic protocol that enables two parties to securely establish a shared secret over an insecure communication channel.
- F. None of above.
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
Provenance (3 batches)
The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.
| Step | Stage | Batch ID | Status | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| creating | Elicitation | batch_69a8861912dc8190931af43b4b9158a7 |
completed | March 4, 2026, 7:20 p.m. |
| NER | Named-entity recognition | batch_69aa6315afdc81908409435bb47e8ee0 |
completed | March 6, 2026, 5:16 a.m. |
| NED1 | Entity disambiguation (via context triple) | batch_69ada0d1882c81908e02e36ab28e7fdc |
completed | March 8, 2026, 4:16 p.m. |
Created at: March 4, 2026, 7:30 p.m.