Triple
T11700302
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix |
E278104
|
entity |
| Predicate | relatedWork |
P37
|
FINISHED |
| Object | Condorcet’s paradox |
E278103
|
NE FINISHED |
How this triple was built (2 steps)
Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.
NER
Named-entity recognition
gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: Condorcet’s paradox | Statement: [Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix, relatedWork, Condorcet’s paradox]
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Condorcet’s paradox Context triple: [Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix, relatedWork, Condorcet’s paradox]
-
A.
Condorcet paradox
chosen
The Condorcet paradox is a voting theory phenomenon where collective preferences can become cyclic and inconsistent, even when individual voters’ preferences are perfectly rational and transitive.
-
B.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory showing that no voting system can convert individual preferences into a collective ranking while simultaneously satisfying a set of seemingly reasonable fairness criteria.
-
C.
Condorcet jury theorem
The Condorcet jury theorem is a result in probability theory and social choice stating that, under certain conditions, the likelihood that a majority vote yields the correct decision increases as the size of the voting group grows.
-
D.
Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a fundamental result in social choice theory showing that every reasonable voting system with at least three options is susceptible to strategic manipulation by voters.
-
E.
Social Choice and Individual Values
Social Choice and Individual Values is a foundational 1951 book by economist Kenneth Arrow that established modern social choice theory and introduced Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
- F. None of above.
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
Provenance (3 batches)
The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.
| Step | Stage | Batch ID | Status | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| creating | Elicitation | batch_69d6aafe02d881909900d54ad7d4af84 |
completed | April 8, 2026, 7:22 p.m. |
| NER | Named-entity recognition | batch_69d8a49a025881909377c81d3debf465 |
completed | April 10, 2026, 7:19 a.m. |
| NED1 | Entity disambiguation (via context triple) | batch_69f08fd4c09081909ee36de77ca67247 |
completed | April 28, 2026, 10:45 a.m. |
Created at: April 8, 2026, 9:40 p.m.