Millian semantics
E883401
Millian semantics is a theory of meaning in philosophy of language that holds that the meaning of a proper name is nothing more than its referent, without any associated descriptive content.
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
referential theory of names
ⓘ
theory of meaning ⓘ view in philosophy of language ⓘ |
| alsoKnownAs |
Millianism
ⓘ
the direct-reference theory of proper names ⓘ |
| appliesTo | proper names ⓘ |
| associatedWith |
David Kaplan
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Keith Donnellan NERFINISHED ⓘ Nathan Salmon NERFINISHED ⓘ Scott Soames NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| basedOnWorkOf | John Stuart Mill NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| claimsAbout |
relationship between meaning and reference
ⓘ
semantic content of proper names ⓘ |
| compatibleWith | Kripke’s arguments against descriptivism ⓘ |
| contrastsWith |
Fregean semantics
ⓘ
descriptivist theories of reference ⓘ sense-reference theories of names ⓘ |
| coreClaim |
co-referential proper names have the same semantic content
ⓘ
proper names lack descriptive content in their semantic value ⓘ the meaning of a proper name is its referent ⓘ |
| denies |
descriptivist theories of proper names
ⓘ
that proper names have associated descriptive senses ⓘ |
| entails |
that names are rigid designators in many formulations
ⓘ
that the semantic content of a name is an object ⓘ |
| evaluatedUsing |
attitude-report data
ⓘ
informative identity statements ⓘ modal arguments ⓘ |
| facesProblem |
Frege’s puzzle about informative identity statements
ⓘ
substitution failures in propositional attitude contexts ⓘ the problem of cognitive significance ⓘ |
| historicalSource | John Stuart Mill’s distinction between denotation and connotation ⓘ |
| implies |
that sentences differing only in co-referential names express the same proposition
ⓘ
that the proposition expressed by a simple name-involving sentence is singular ⓘ |
| influenced |
contemporary direct-reference theories
ⓘ
neo-Russellian theories of propositions ⓘ |
| influencedBy | John Stuart Mill’s view that proper names have denotation without connotation ⓘ |
| inTensionWith |
Fregean sense theory
ⓘ
some cognitive and psychological accounts of meaning ⓘ |
| oftenCombinedWith |
a Russellian view of propositions
ⓘ
a direct-reference account of indexicals and demonstratives ⓘ |
| rejects | that names encode descriptive modes of presentation ⓘ |
| supports | direct reference ⓘ |
| topicIn |
analytic philosophy
ⓘ
formal semantics of natural language ⓘ philosophy of language ⓘ |
| usedInDebate |
about the nature of propositions
ⓘ
about the semantics of attitude ascriptions ⓘ about the semantics of belief reports ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.