The Concept of Mind
E85001
The Concept of Mind is a 1949 philosophical work by Gilbert Ryle that critiques Cartesian dualism and introduces the idea of mental concepts as dispositions rather than inner ghostly states.
Statements (43)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
book
ⓘ
philosophical work ⓘ |
| arguesAgainst | the view that mind is a separate non-physical substance ⓘ |
| arguesFor | understanding mental vocabulary in terms of dispositions to act ⓘ |
| author | Gilbert Ryle ⓘ |
| centralThesis |
Cartesian dualism rests on a category mistake
ⓘ
mental concepts refer to dispositions to behave rather than to inner ghostly states ⓘ |
| countryOfOrigin | United Kingdom ⓘ |
| criticizes |
Cartesian dualism
ⓘ
the dogma of the ghost in the machine ⓘ |
| deweyDecimalClassification | 128 ⓘ |
| firstEditionFormat | print ⓘ |
| genre |
analytic philosophy
ⓘ
philosophy of mind ⓘ |
| hasImpactOn |
debates about mental states and behavior
ⓘ
interpretations of dualism ⓘ |
| hasReception | considered a classic in philosophy of mind ⓘ |
| hasReprint | multiple later editions ⓘ |
| influenced |
behaviorist approaches to the mind
ⓘ
ordinary language philosophy ⓘ philosophy of mind in the 20th century ⓘ |
| influencedBy |
logical positivism
ⓘ
ordinary language analysis ⓘ |
| introducesConcept |
category mistake
ⓘ
dispositional analysis of mental states ⓘ |
| language | English ⓘ |
| libraryOfCongressClassification | BD418.3 ⓘ |
| mainTopic |
behaviorism in philosophy of mind
ⓘ
category mistakes ⓘ critique of Cartesian dualism ⓘ mental concepts as dispositions ⓘ philosophy of mind ⓘ |
| notablePhrase | ghost in the machine ⓘ |
| philosophicalPosition |
anti-Cartesian
ⓘ
non-dualist ⓘ |
| philosophicalTradition | analytic philosophy ⓘ |
| publicationYear | 1949 ⓘ |
| publisher | Hutchinson ⓘ |
| relatedWorkOfAuthor | Dilemmas ⓘ |
| structure | collection of chapters on different mental concepts ⓘ |
| subjectOf |
academic courses in philosophy of mind
ⓘ
extensive philosophical commentary ⓘ |
| timePeriod | 20th-century philosophy ⓘ |
Referenced by (2)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
subject surface form:
Gilbert Ryle