Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
E840030
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm is a foundational work in organizational and contract theory that analyzes how incomplete contracts shape firm boundaries, ownership structures, and incentives.
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
academic paper
ⓘ
economic theory article ⓘ |
| addresses |
allocation of control in organizations
ⓘ
boundaries between firms and markets ⓘ limits of complete contingent contracts ⓘ why firms own assets rather than contract over them ⓘ |
| analyzes |
how incomplete contracts shape firm boundaries
ⓘ
how ownership allocation affects incentives ⓘ trade-offs between market transactions and integration ⓘ |
| appliesTo |
corporate ownership decisions
ⓘ
design of long-term relationships ⓘ organizational boundary decisions ⓘ vertical integration choices ⓘ |
| contributesTo |
modern theory of the firm
ⓘ
organizational design theory ⓘ property-rights theory of the firm ⓘ |
| emphasizes |
impact of contractual incompleteness on organizational form
ⓘ
importance of residual control rights ⓘ role of asset ownership in providing incentives ⓘ |
| field |
contract theory
ⓘ
law and economics ⓘ organizational economics ⓘ theory of the firm ⓘ |
| focusesOn |
asset ownership
ⓘ
firm boundaries ⓘ hold-up problem ⓘ incentive structures ⓘ incomplete contracts ⓘ ownership structures ⓘ residual control rights ⓘ vertical integration ⓘ |
| influenced |
corporate governance theory
ⓘ
law and economics of contracts ⓘ organizational economics literature ⓘ subsequent research on firm boundaries ⓘ |
| provides |
formal framework for analyzing integration decisions
ⓘ
formal framework for analyzing ownership allocation ⓘ microeconomic foundation for the theory of the firm ⓘ |
| recognizedAs |
foundational work in contract theory
ⓘ
foundational work in organizational economics ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
incomplete contracting literature
ⓘ
property-rights approach to the firm ⓘ transaction cost economics ⓘ |
| usesConcept |
bargaining power
ⓘ
ex post renegotiation ⓘ incomplete contracting ⓘ relationship-specific investments ⓘ residual rights of control ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.