“The evolution of reciprocal altruism”

E760895

“The evolution of reciprocal altruism” is a landmark 1971 paper by Robert Trivers that introduced a formal evolutionary theory explaining how cooperation can arise and be maintained among non-kin through repeated interactions and mutual benefit.

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Predicate Object
instanceOf landmark paper in evolutionary biology
scientific paper
addresses applications to human social behavior
conditions under which reciprocal altruism is evolutionarily stable
differences between kin selection and reciprocity
author Robert Trivers NERFINISHED
coreClaim altruistic acts can evolve if they are reliably reciprocated
mechanisms for detecting and avoiding cheaters are crucial for stable reciprocity
selection can favor individuals who help non-kin when future returns exceed current costs
emphasizesConcept cheater detection
contingent cooperation
costly helping behavior
delayed return benefits
punishment of defectors
stability of cooperative strategies
field behavioral ecology NERFINISHED
evolutionary biology
evolutionary psychology
influencedAuthor John Maynard Smith NERFINISHED
Martin Nowak NERFINISHED
Richard Dawkins NERFINISHED
influencedConcept indirect reciprocity
partner choice models of cooperation
strong reciprocity
tit-for-tat strategy in game theory
influencedField anthropology of human cooperation
evolutionary game theory
evolutionary psychology of cooperation
primatology
sociobiology
influencedWork The Selfish Gene NERFINISHED
language English
mainTopic evolution of cooperation
game-theoretic models of behavior
natural selection
non-kin cooperation
reciprocal altruism
proposesTheoryOf how cooperation can evolve among non-kin
maintenance of cooperation through repeated interactions
publicationYear 1971
recognizedAs classic paper in behavioral ecology
foundational work on the evolution of cooperation
usesConcept evolutionarily stable strategies
mutual benefit
repeated interactions

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Robert Trivers notableWork “The evolution of reciprocal altruism”