essay "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?"
E695574
"Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" is a seminal essay by H. A. Prichard that challenges the foundations of moral philosophy by arguing that attempts to derive moral obligation from theoretical reasoning are fundamentally misguided.
Observed surface forms (1)
| Surface form | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? | 0 |
Statements (47)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
moral philosophy essay
ⓘ
philosophical essay ⓘ |
| author |
H. A. Prichard
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Harold Arthur Prichard NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| conclusion |
moral philosophy should clarify, not justify, our recognition of duties
ⓘ
our sense of obligation is basic and not derivable from non-moral premises ⓘ |
| criticizes |
the attempt to justify our sense of duty by philosophical argument
ⓘ
the project of grounding moral obligation in a general theory of the good ⓘ |
| field |
ethics
ⓘ
metaethics ⓘ moral philosophy ⓘ |
| genre | academic essay ⓘ |
| historicalContext | early 20th-century British moral philosophy ⓘ |
| influenced |
20th-century analytic moral philosophy
ⓘ
W. D. Ross NERFINISHED ⓘ later intuitionist ethicists ⓘ |
| language | English ⓘ |
| mainArgument | attempts to derive moral obligation from theoretical reasoning are misguided ⓘ |
| mainClaim |
moral philosophy errs when it tries to prove that we ought to do what we already recognize we ought to do
ⓘ
we know some moral obligations directly and intuitively rather than by inference ⓘ |
| mainTopic |
deontological ethics
ⓘ
foundations of moral philosophy ⓘ intuitionism in ethics ⓘ moral epistemology ⓘ moral obligation ⓘ |
| notableFor |
challenging the project of providing a theoretical foundation for moral obligation
ⓘ
defending the immediacy of moral knowledge ⓘ its influence on intuitionist and deontological ethics in the 20th century ⓘ |
| opposes |
deriving ‘ought’ from purely non-moral facts
ⓘ
deriving ‘ought’ from ‘good’ ⓘ reductive accounts of moral obligation ⓘ |
| philosophicalIssueAddressed |
the nature of justification for moral duties
ⓘ
whether moral requirements can be justified by reasoning from non-moral premises ⓘ |
| philosophicalStance |
ethical intuitionism
ⓘ
non-naturalist moral realism ⓘ |
| philosophicalTradition | analytic philosophy ⓘ |
| positionCriticized |
any theory that bases duty on consequences
ⓘ
deriving moral obligation from the good ⓘ hedonistic utilitarianism ⓘ ideal utilitarianism ⓘ |
| relatedConcept |
duty for duty’s sake
ⓘ
prima facie duties ⓘ self-evident moral truths ⓘ |
| relatedWorkOfAuthor | Moral Obligation NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| viewOfMoralKnowledge | some moral truths are known by direct apprehension ⓘ |
| viewOfObligation | obligations are self-evident in certain situations ⓘ |
| viewOfReason | theoretical reasoning cannot generate moral obligation ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
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